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Abstract 
Knowing how we feel about a group is enough to influence whether we perceive the group as 
threatening or non-threatening. Some theories assume that threat causes prejudice, such as 
integrated threat theory (ITT; Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and other 
cognitively-oriented models of prejudice. An affective primacy perspective (Crandall et al., 
2011; Pryor et al., 1999; Zajonc, 1980) instead suggests that prejudice can cause perception of 
threat. Four experiments tested the hypothesis that prejudice causes heightened perception of 
threat, using affective conditioning to create negative (Expts. 1-3) or emotionally specific 
(disgust-provoking or fear-provoking; Expt. 4) affective associations with unfamiliar social 
groups. When a group was associated with negative affect, its members were stereotyped as 
more threatening and less warm (but no less competent) compared to when it was associated 
with positive affect (Expts. 1, 3). Conditioned prejudice increased perception of threat (Expts. 2 
and 4), and caused a consistent pattern of behavioral response tendencies (Expts. 3 and 4). 
Groups associated with negative affect were more likely to be aggressed against, and less likely 
to be approached. The effect of conditioning was statistically reliable for judgments of warmth 
and threat, but not for judgments of competence (Expts. 1-3). Disgust conditioning increased 
perception of symbolic threat and realistic threat, and increased aggressive response tendencies 
(Expt. 4). The effect of disgust on aggressive behaviors was mediated by symbolic threat, and the 
effect of disgust on avoidance and approach behaviors was mediated by realistic threat.  
Together, the findings demonstrate that prejudice can cause perception of threat, which 
undermines the favored interpretation of the correlational basis of cognitively-oriented theories 
such as ITT. Correlational data in support of cognitively-oriented theories is consistent with both 
directional paths—threat can cause prejudice, and prejudice can cause perception of threat. 
iv 
Experiments are necessary to distinguish between threat’s role as a cause for prejudice and 
threat’s role as a justification of prejudice. 
v 
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Feelings Tell Us Friend or Foe: Threat as Justification for Prejudice 
Articulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already 
been impressed in favor of the same conclusion. 
--William James (1902), p. 74, “The Varieties of Religious Experience” 
Affective reactions are fast, automatic, and potent. They are fundamental components of 
human interaction and guide our behavior in intergroup settings. Affective information is 
evolutionarily significant, helping us decide whether to seek affiliation with, attack, or avoid 
members of other groups. Yet current theoretical models of prejudice focus mainly on cognitive 
factors that lead to prejudiced responses, such as mere categorization (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) 
and appraisal of threat (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). By contrast, 
the present research investigates the possibility that prejudice—the activation of negative affect 
toward a social group—temporally precedes and causally influences perception of threat in 
intergroup contexts. 
The relative contributions of affect and cognition in explaining human thought and 
behavior is a complex issue that demands empirical attention (Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). 
Some theorists support a separate systems view (Zajonc, 1980, 2001), suggesting that affect and 
cognition operate via independent, though often interacting, systems. Others argue that affect and 
cognition are part of a single information-processing system (Lazarus, 1984). My research adopts 
Zajonc’s separate systems view, and extends the analysis to consider the presumed direction of 
causality (and, by extension, temporal patterning) in the affective and cognitive components of 
prejudice.  
Prejudice, stereotypes and perception of threat are conceptually and empirically distinct 
concepts. Stereotypes are cognitive schemas for organizing knowledge about a social group 
2 
(Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996). Perception of threat is a cognitive appraisal of 
potential harm or other negative consequences to oneself or to one’s ingroup (Stephan & Renfro, 
2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Prejudice, by comparison, is affective in nature and reflects 
negative feelings about a social group. I adopt the definition of prejudice from integrated threat 
theory—“negative affect associated with outgroups” (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 27; see also 
Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002)—and I operationalize 
prejudice in my experiments as a negative affective association with a social group. 
Often, a perceiver that holds stereotypic or threat-relevant beliefs about a social group 
also has prejudice toward the group. But it could be that stereotypes and threat cause the 
prejudice, prejudice causes the stereotypes and threat perception, or both causal pathways may 
be equally valid descriptions of the relationship between prejudice and threat. Experimental 
methods are needed to evaluate each of these possibilities. 
Cognition as Causal 
The cognitive revolution of the 1950’s and 1960’s shifted the emphasis within 
psychological research and theory to focus on human mental processes such as mental 
representation, judgment and decision making, internal mental states, language, and problem 
solving skills. The area of stereotyping and prejudice was strongly influenced by the cognitive 
zeitgeist—many conceptual perspectives on prejudice adopt a cognitive approach in which 
prejudice is assumed to be caused by categorization and the mental representation of stereotypes. 
Tajfel’s (1969, 1970) work on categorization and the minimal groups situation was very 
influential in orienting the field to a cognitive perspective. Research on the minimal groups 
paradigm showed that categorization into groups, provided that the basis of categorization was 
not patently arbitrary, was enough to produce ingroup bias. This was an important discovery 
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because it suggested that stereotyping and prejudice are products of normal cognitive 
functioning. The shift to cognitive explanations of intergroup bias marked an important departure 
from an earlier focus on individual differences (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & 
Sanford, 1950; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939).   
For the next several decades, stereotyping and prejudice researchers focused primarily on 
documenting the consequences of social categorization. An impressive array of findings were 
amassed by research in the cognitive tradition, including work on illusory correlation (Hamilton 
& Gifford, 1976), numerical distinctiveness (Taylor, 1981), outgroup homogeneity (Park & 
Rothbart, 1982), the ultimate attribution error (Pettigrew, 1979), self-fulfilling prophecies 
(Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977), and many other important findings that have enhanced the 
field’s understanding of categorization processes. 
Decades of research emphasizing cognitive explanations for stereotyping and prejudice 
has left its mark on the field both theoretically and empirically. Reflecting on the consequences 
of the cognitive revolution for research on intergroup relations, Park and Judd (2005) noted that 
“the evaluative aspects of stereotype content took center stage and came to be viewed as the 
cause of prejudice, rather than the other way around” (p. 110). This cognitive theoretical focus 
was in part due to the adaptability of cognitive methods that dominated existing research 
paradigms. In his review of the stereotyping literature, Jack Brigham reasoned that “in order to 
feel negatively toward a group, one must be able to perceive the different individuals of the 
given ethnic group as having certain constant characteristics, as being similar to other individuals 
in the same group, and as being different from individuals not of that ethnic group,” (Brigham, 
1971, p. 26). This statement reflects the prevailing belief that stereotypes are a necessary 
precursor to prejudiced affect.  
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The cognitive movement has not yet lost momentum nor been overthrown. There have 
been occasional pockets of dissent, with scholars like Silvan Tomkins warning that the neglect of 
affect in psychological science “is yet another unfortunate consequence of the hypertrophy of 
cognitive imperialism (Tomkins, 1981, p. 328).” The minority view, however, has yet had 
minimal impact on the field as a whole. 
Putting Affect First 
The causal focus on cognition apparent in many contemporary models of prejudice is at 
odds with empirical findings regarding the automaticity of evaluative processing (Forgas, 2001; 
Hamilton, 1981; Park & Judd, 2005; Pettigrew, 2004). William James surely appreciated the 
significance of affect in explaining human thought and behavior, writing “Our judgments 
concerning the worth of things, big or little, depend on the feelings [emphasis added] the things 
arouse in us. Where we judge a thing to be precious in consequence of the idea we frame of it, 
this is only because the idea is itself associated already with a feeling (James, 1899, p. 229).” Yet 
James’ insight has largely been overlooked in contemporary psychological theories of 
stereotyping and prejudice.  
There are several reasons to believe that the activation of the mental representation of 
affect is likely to precede the activation of associated cognitions, among these being speed and 
automaticity. Zajonc and other separate-systems theorists have characterized affective responses 
as quicker, more automatic, and less complex than cognitive responses (Cacioppo, Gardner, & 
Bernston, 1999; Zajonc, 1980, 2001; Zajonc, Pietromonaco, & Bargh, 1981). Many different 
features of affect, including its valence, arousal properties, and motivational properties, have the 
potential to influence social judgments and behaviors (Forgas, 1995).  
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Several different dual-process models propose that people’s reactions to attitude objects 
or events are best described by separable automatic and controlled processes (Devine, 1989; 
Fazio, 1990; Pryor, Reeder, & Landau, 1999; Weiner, 1986). First, an associative process 
automatically activates an affective reaction; second, a more deliberative process guides 
consideration of possible reasons for the affective reaction, and occasionally makes adjustments 
to the initial reaction. Pryor and his colleagues (1999) adopt the dual-process framework in their 
two-factor theory of stigma. The theory suggests that people’s negative affective reactions to 
people with AIDS are automatically activated by the negative affect associated with the disease, 
stigma, homosexuality, and other related concepts. This initial reaction can be adjusted to 
become more positive through involvement of a cognitive, rule-based system, though such an 
adjustment requires adequate time, cognitive resources, and motivation. 
Pryor et al. note that their model is consistent with Zajonc’s (1980) ideas about the 
primacy of affect: “Evaluative responses often flow immediately from our encounters with a 
stimulus. We don’t have to think about them” (Pryor et al., 1999, p. 1200). Further, their focus 
on explaining reactions to stigma extends the affective primacy perspective to the area of 
stereotyping and prejudice. Substantial empirical evidence attests to the primacy of affective 
reactions in intergroup contexts; affective reactions predict intergroup attitudes better than 
cognitive factors (Dijker, 1987; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; L. A. Jackson & Sullivan, 
1989; Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 1995). Nevertheless, many theoretical perspectives on 
prejudice focus on cognitive factors as primary and causal. The present research evaluates the 
idea that in intergroup contexts, affective responses may come first, followed by associated 
cognitions. This work adopts an affective primacy perspective (Crandall, Bahns, Warner, & 
Schaller, 2011; Pryor et al., 1999; Zajonc, 1980) to challenge the assumption that cognitive 
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factors such as perception of threat and stereotyping cause prejudice, and instead tests the 
hypothesis that prejudice can cause perception of threat. 
Prevailing Models of Prejudice and Threat 
Emotions and threat are central concepts in much intergroup relations research. Yet many 
theoretical models of prejudice suggest a causal ordering of the affective and cognitive 
components of prejudice that is exactly the opposite of how emotions and threat are experienced 
in real social interactions. Emotions are fast, potent, and difficult to control; they are part of an 
automatic response system that instinctively guides social behavior (Cacioppo et al., 1999; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990). By comparison, stereotypes and perception of threat are more 
reasoned responses that are slower to develop and easier to control; they are part of a controlled, 
rule-based processing system (Pryor et al., 1999). Bodenhausen and Moreno (2000) note that “as 
important as stereotypes may be in shaping the nature of intergroup perception and behavior, it is 
the feeling states that arise in the presence of members of stereotyped groups that provide the 
background tone for all intergroup interactions” (p. 283). Thus it is quite surprising that several 
theories of prejudice propose that threat (not affect or emotion) causes prejudice, and fail to 
consider the alternative possibility that prejudice might also cause perception of threat. 
Social Dominance Theory 
Social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) describes prejudice as 
stemming from attitudes, values, and beliefs about social hierarchy called legitimizing myths. 
High status group members use legitimizing myths such as the Protestant Work Ethic, 
meritocracy beliefs, or political conservatism to endorse and maintain a system of inequality 
among social groups. SDT predicts that threat—in particular, threat to the existing social 
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hierarchy—causes prejudice. Prejudice is expressed through endorsement of hierarchy-
enhancing rather than hierarchy-attenuating ideals and policies.  
While there is support for the notion that threat to social hierarchy causes prejudice, the 
possibility that prejudice causes perception of threat has not been empirically tested. 
Experimental studies that have manipulated threat to the ingroup’s status have found increased 
prejudice toward low status outgroups (L. M. Jackson & Esses, 2000; Nierman & Crandall, 
2008, February; Pratto & Shih, 2000). For example, L. M. Jackson and Esses (2000) found that 
increasing perceived economic competition reduced support for empowering forms of help for 
immigrant groups. Future studies should test the reverse causal model by manipulating prejudice 
toward a group and measuring perceived threat to social hierarchy posed by that group. 
Integrated Threat Theory 
Compared to SDT, integrated threat theory (ITT; Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & 
Stephan, 2000) adopts a broader approach to understanding the relationship between prejudice 
and threat. The model identifies four types of threat—realistic threats, symbolic threats, 
intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotyping—as causes of prejudice. Realistic threats include 
any threat to the welfare of the ingroup such as a threat to the ingroup’s political or economic 
power, or physical well-being. The concept of realistic threat is based on Realistic Group 
Conflict Theory (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966). Symbolic threats are threats to the 
ingroup’s values and beliefs and may be real or imagined. The concept of symbolic threat comes 
from Modern and Symbolic Racism Theories (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986). 
Intergroup anxiety stems from the anticipation of negative or uncomfortable intergroup 
interactions. The idea is derived from Intergroup Anxiety Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). 
Negative stereotypes are considered to be a specific type of threat because they foster fear of 
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negative consequences in intergroup interactions. For example, the belief that a group is 
dangerous can evoke a sense of threat by communicating the expectation that one may be 
harmed by members of the stereotyped group. 
Insofar as negative stereotypes represent a type of threat, ITT suggests that stereotypes 
are causes of prejudice. Some empirical evidence attests to this idea; manipulating the valence of 
stereotype traits ascribed to a group revealed that negative stereotypes increased negative 
attitudes toward that group (Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 2005, Study 2). 
But stereotypes might also be consequences of prejudice, emerging after the activation of 
negative affect. Crandall et al. (2011)
1
 provide initial experimental evidence that negative 
affective associations with social groups cause stereotypes to emerge as justifications for 
prejudice. Using both subliminal and supraliminal conditioning methods, Crandall et al. created 
negative associations with unfamiliar social groups. Groups associated with negative affect were 
stereotyped as less warm but no less competent. The present research extends this work by 
considering emergent stereotypes that result from prejudice as part of the more general process 
of threat perception. 
The very core of ITT is the assumption that the perception of threat causes prejudice. But 
many of the initial studies cited in support of the theory provide only correlational evidence. 
Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman (1999) measured realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup 
anxiety, and stereotypes associated with Cuban, Mexican and Asian immigrants, as well as 
prejudice toward these immigrant groups. Prejudice was significantly related to all four types of 
threat. Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, and Tur-Kaspa (1998) found similar results for 
attitudes toward immigrant groups in other cultural contexts. These findings have been 
interpreted as supportive of the basic causal assumption that threat causes prejudice. Yet the data 
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are wholly consistent with the reverse causal model—that prejudice causes perception of threat. 
Experimental evidence is needed in order to draw conclusions about either causal direction. 
Experimental methods have been used to test the causal predictions of ITT. Realistic 
threats, symbolic threats, negative stereotypes, and intergroup anxiety were each manipulated 
and found to increase prejudice toward immigrants (Stephan et al., 2005). However, Stephan and 
colleagues acknowledge that “although these studies clearly support the basic causal assumption 
of the theory (threats lead to prejudice), they do not preclude the possibility that the opposite 
causal pathway exists” (Stephan & Renfro, 2002, p. 196). To my knowledge the causal pathway 
from prejudice to perception of threat still has not been experimentally tested (with the exception 
of Crandall et al. (2011), which experimentally tested the causal pathway from prejudice to 
stereotypes). 
Since its original instantiation, Stephan and colleagues have revised ITT to include 
antecedents and consequences of threat, although they assert “the core of the model is still the 
idea that threat causes prejudice” (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 37). 
One of the antecedent factors shown to influence perceived threat is intergroup contact. Positive 
intergroup contact is associated with lesser threat and more positive attitudes, whereas negative 
contact is associated with greater threat and more negative attitudes (e.g., Stephan, Diaz-Loving, 
& Duran, 2000). The quality of the contact being positive/favorable or negative/unfavorable is 
inevitably shaped by the feelings aroused during an intergroup encounter. Thus one could argue 
that quality of intergroup contact is really a proxy for affect. Accordingly, the possibility that 
prejudice (i.e., negative affect) causes threat may already be implicit in the ITT framework. 
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Prejudice as Specific Emotion 
ITT treats prejudice as a unidimensional construct, collapsing across negative emotions 
such as hatred and distain and evaluative reactions such as disliking and disapproval. Recently, 
however, many different researchers have called for a multidimensional view of prejudice that is 
more sensitive to the constraints of specific intergroup contexts (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Mackie et al., 2000). Several theoretical models conceive of 
prejudice as specific negative emotions such as disgust, anger, fear, contempt, guilt, envy, 
admiration, and pity. Proponents of these models argue that measuring prejudice as general 
negative affect masks interesting variability in the specific emotional reactions evoked by 
different groups. Specific threats may trigger specific emotions (e.g., threat to safety→ fear), 
which in turn direct behavioral responses (e.g., fear→ escape); the traditional conception of 
prejudice as a general attitude or evaluation is not able to distinguish between the differentiated 
intergroup consequences of fear and disgust, for example. 
The sociofunctional approach. Cottrell and Neuberg’s sociofunctional threat-based 
approach to prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) asserts that specific 
feelings associated with different social groups depend on specific tangible threats posed by the 
groups; a sociofunctional framework suggests, “from qualitatively different threats should 
emerge qualitatively different, and functionally relevant, emotions” (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005, 
p. 770). The theory adopts a threat-based appraisal framework and focuses on group-relevant 
threats rather than individual threats. The core assumption is that the perception of specific 
threats to tangible ingroup resources or group structures leads to specific emotional reactions. A 
defining characteristic of the approach is that it allows for multiple threats to be posed by a 
single outgroup, which in turn may evoke multiple emotional reactions. Thus the sociofunctional 
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approach to prejudice affords a more nuanced and multidimensional view of intergroup relations 
compared to traditional models that view prejudice as a general attitude or evaluation such as 
SDT or ITT. 
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) had participants rate a number of social groups on specific 
types of threat posed by the groups and specific emotional reactions they experienced in thinking 
about the groups. Different social groups were associated with different types of threat and 
different emotional reactions. For example, African Americans were associated with threats to 
the ingroup’s property and physical safety, and with emotional reactions of fear and pity; gay 
men were associated with threat to the ingroup’s health and value systems, and with emotional 
reactions of disgust and pity. Because the sociofunctional framework “assigns causal priority to 
perceived threats,” the researchers used multiple regression to demonstrate that specific emotions 
are predicted by specific threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005, p. 783). But these data only 
demonstrate that specific threats are correlationally linked to specific emotions. It could be that 
perceiving that a group poses a threat to safety causes fear, or it could be that being afraid of a 
group fosters the perception that the group poses a threat to safety. If researchers could 
manipulate the type of threat posed by a group in the absence of pre-existing feelings toward or 
beliefs about the group, and measure the specific emotional reactions that result, it would provide 
a stronger causal test of the theory. Alternatively, the reverse causal model could be tested by 
manipulating emotional reactions to a novel group, and measuring perceived threats that result. 
Intergroup emotions theory. Intergroup emotions theory (IET; Mackie et al., 2000; E. 
R. Smith, 1993) predicts that situational appraisals of potential harm or benefit to the ingroup 
cause specific emotional reactions, which in turn lead to differentiated intergroup action 
tendencies. The theory incorporates ideas from appraisal-theories of emotions (Frijida, 1986; 
12 
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and extends these ideas to the 
group level—most importantly the assertion that cognitive involvement is necessary in order to 
experience an emotion. In this regard, IET draws from social identity and self-categorization 
theories (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) in its 
assumptions that individuals who identify with a social group evaluate their own circumstances 
in intergroup terms. An IET framework conceptualizes threat as “appraisals of situations or 
events related to social identity [that] focus on social rather than personal concerns: 
Individuals…experience emotions because their group may be helped or hurt by it” (Mackie et 
al., 2000, p. 603). Social identity relevant appraisals evoke social emotions in reference to an 
outgroup target. Thus IET is consistent with the assertion that cognitive appraisal of threat causes 
prejudice. 
Mackie and colleagues (2000) found that when social identity was made salient in the 
context of a value conflict, appraisals of ingroup strength (relative to the outgroup) increased 
feelings of outgroup anger, which in turn predicted the desire to move against (confront, oppose, 
or argue with) the outgroup opponent. They experimentally manipulated appraisals of ingroup 
strength, thus lending support to the theory’s causal assumption that cognitive appraisal 
influences emotional reactions and intergroup behavior. If, however, affect were conceived of as 
the primary causal factor in this process, a revised model might instead predict that first 
encountering an outgroup member evokes a specific emotional reaction, and second, cognitive 
appraisal processes help to interpret the affect. There is some evidence in support of this revised 
model; the experience of (context-free) group-based anger increased women’s appraisal of 
gender discrimination in response to an ambiguous event, which in turn increased collective 
action (Leonard, Moons, Mackie, & Smith, 2011). But a strict interpretation of IET would 
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suggest that a situation-specific emotional response mediated the effect of the discrimination 
appraisal on collective action. Additional research is needed in support of the idea that incidental 
emotion prompts emotion consistent appraisals of group-based threat. 
Evaluating the Prevailing Models 
SDT, ITT, IET, and the sociofunctional approach each make similar predictions about the 
role of threat in prejudice. All assume that threat causes prejudice, although to differing degrees 
of specificity. SDT and ITT consider prejudice as a general negative evaluation of a social group. 
IET and the sociofunctional approach instead highlight the role of threat in evoking specific 
emotional reactions to social groups. Each of these theories is plausible, and there is good data to 
support the predictions (with the exception of the sociofunctional approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) for which there is not yet a published experimental test of the 
theory’s basic causal assumption). Even so, the existing evidence does not rule out the possibility 
that the reverse causal direction—prejudice causes perception of threat—might be an equally 
valid depiction of the relationship between prejudice and threat. 
As affective responses are so quick and automatic, it is plausible and even likely that 
affective reactions may, in fact, precede and causally influence cognitive appraisal processes 
such as the perception of threat. If affect were instead conceptualized as primary and causal, each 
of these theories might instead predict that encountering an outgroup member first and foremost 
evokes an affective reaction, and that the affect in turn influences the perception of threat. 
Threat as Justification for Prejudice 
The causal pathway I propose and test in this research is consistent with the justification-
suppression model of prejudice expression (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). According to the 
JSM, the experience of prejudice creates psychological tension and discomfort due to conflict 
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between genuinely felt negative affect toward a group and egalitarian beliefs and social norms of 
non-prejudice. Consequently, people are reluctant to openly express prejudice, and prejudice is 
often initially suppressed. People are more willing to express prejudice, however, when there is 
an available justification for it. Justification processes serve as releasers of prejudice by forming 
an acceptable explanation for having negative feelings about a group. Prejudice expression—
made possible by justification—is a pleasant experience for the perceiver because it decreases 
built-up tension and restores psychological balance. 
Classic writings on prejudice have theorized about the justification function of 
stereotypes and threat perceptions (Allport, 1954; Katz & Braly, 1933; LaPiere, 1936; Lippman, 
1922), but there is surprisingly little empirical evidence to support the idea. LaPiere (1936) 
identified perceived threats, which he called “type-rationalizations”, as the primary reasons given 
to explain Californians’ antipathy toward Armenian immigrants. Specifically, LaPiere identified 
beliefs that Armenians were “dishonest, lying and deceitful,” “parasitic and not self-sufficient,” 
and that they had “an inferior code of social morality” as perceived threats used to rationalize 
negative attitudes (LaPiere, 1936, p. 233-234). While his analysis suggests that Amrenian 
antipathy predated the development and application of type-rationalizations, the data are unable 
to address the causal relationship between prejudice and threat. 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that stereotypes may function as justifications for 
behavioral discrimination (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002; Rutland 
& Brown, 2001). For example, following an experimental manipulation that induced Scottish 
students to discriminate in favor of Scotland and against England, these students (compared to 
those in control conditions) showed evidence of more favorable stereotypes of Scots and more 
negative stereotypes of the English (Rutland & Brown, 2001). 
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There is also evidence to suggest that threat perception serves a justification function. 
Pereira, Vala and Costa-Lopez (2010) found that prejudice was associated with increased 
perceptions of realistic and symbolic threat, which in turn was associated with opposition to 
immigration and naturalization, respectively. Pereira et al. propose that threat perception serves 
as justification for discrimination. 
But there is no prior evidence to suggest that threat perception and stereotypes are 
justifications for mere prejudice. This is an important distinction because overt behavioral 
discrimination is usually publicly observable, unlike the intrapsychic experience of prejudiced 
affect. Thus threat perceptions and stereotypes may emerge as justifications for discrimination as 
part of an impression-management process. If threat perception and stereotypes do in fact emerge 
as justifications for mere prejudice, it implies the formation of stereotypes that are truly 
internalized. The current study departs from Periera et al. (2010) in two important ways: 
Experimental methods are used to test the causal prediction that prejudice causes perception of 
threat, and threat is conceptualized as a justification for mere prejudice rather than as 
justification for discrimination. 
Even in the absence of behavioral discrimination, perceptions of threat can offer 
acceptable justification for prejudiced affect. Negative feelings about a group are uncomfortable 
and problematic if left unexplained.  Perceiving that a group is dangerous, violent, or 
untrustworthy may be an acceptable justification for having bad feelings about them. 
Justifications may be general or specific (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003); thus perceiving a group 
as threatening—even if the perception is vague—could be adequate justification for prejudice. 
The task of justifying specific negative emotions experienced in conjunction with a particular 
group may be better served, however, by more specific types of threat perception. For example, 
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perceiving a group as threatening the traditional morals and values of the ingroup might justify 
feeling disgusted by (or, potentially, angry at) the group. Alternatively, perceiving a threat to the 
safety and well-being of the ingroup might justify feeling afraid of the group. 
The present research experimentally manipulated either positive and negative 
(Experiments 1-3) or emotionally specific (disgust-provoking or fear-provoking; Experiment 4) 
affective associations with novel social groups. This method was used in order to test the 
hypothesis consistent with an affective primacy perspective (Crandall et al., 2011; Pryor et al., 
1999; Zajonc, 1980) that prejudice causes heightened perception of threat. These experiments 
will help determine whether correlational evidence linking prejudice and threat is uniquely 
supportive of ITT’s (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) claim that threat causes prejudice, or, whether 
both directional paths—threat causes prejudice and prejudice causes perception of threat—are 
equally valid descriptions of the relationship between prejudice and threat. 
Overview 
 Four experiments tested the hypothesis that stereotypes and perceptions of threat emerge 
from mere prejudice. I used affective conditioning methods to create novel prejudices toward 
unfamiliar social groups. These methods drew upon evidence that affectively-laden attitudes can 
be created through associative learning processes (De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; 
Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, & Lynn, 1992; Livingston & Drwecki, 2007; Olson & Fazio, 2001). 
Perceiving an attitude object in coincidence with positively- or negatively-valued stimuli fosters 
a corresponding positive or negative attitude toward that object. Because affective reactions are 
diffuse and nonspecific, they can be easily displaced onto unrelated stimuli. It has been shown, 
for example, that affective primes produce significant shifts in evaluations of novel stimuli. 
Participants rated Chinese ideographs that were initially affectively neutral as more likeable 
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when they were preceded by happy facial expressions and less likeable when they were preceded 
with angry facial expressions compared to when they were preceded by a neutral prime (Murphy 
& Zajonc, 1993). 
Experiments 1-3 employed a supraliminal conditioning paradigm adapted from Olson and 
Fazio (2001) to create negative and positive affective associations with unfamiliar groups. 
Experiment 4 used an adapted version of this conditioning paradigm to create the emotionally 
specific associations of disgust and fear with unfamiliar groups. The immediate consequence of 
these methods was the creation of "pure" prejudices—mere affective associations 
uncontaminated by prior stereotypes, prior threat perceptions, or even any prior knowledge about 
the groups. 
 Following the creation of these prejudices, I assessed stereotypic beliefs about the target 
groups, perceptions of threat posed by the target groups, and behavioral response tendencies. 
These methods allowed me to test the hypothesis that prejudice causes heightened perception of 
threat, thereby reversing the causal pathway between threat and prejudice that is suggested by 
ITT (Stephan et al., 2000; Stephan & Renfro, 2002). 
Experiment 1 
ITT (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) suggests that negative 
stereotypes, as one of the four major types of threat, are causes of prejudice. An affective 
primacy perspective instead suggests that stereotypes may be consequences of prejudice, 
emerging after the activation of negative affect (Crandall et al., 2011; Pryor et al., 1999; Zajonc, 
1980). Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that newly created prejudice causes stereotypes to 
emerge as justifications for prejudice. 
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The stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002) asserts that group stereotypes can be 
usefully summarized in terms of two fundamental dimensions of social judgment: warmth and 
competence. Warmth connotes a group’s competitive intent (i.e., friend or foe). Competence 
connotes a group’s ability to enact its intent. Group stereotypes can be highly negative along one 
dimension while being positive along the other (Fiske et al., 2002; Schaller & Abeysinghe, 
2006). Therefore, in testing whether affectively conditioned prejudice causes stereotypes, I 
assessed separately the extent to which these emerging stereotypes had specific contents relevant 
to the warmth dimension, the competence dimension, or both. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 105 undergraduates (77 women) at the University of Kansas from the 
introductory psychology subject pool. They received course credit for participating in the study. 
Pre-testing of Target Countries 
A separate sample (N = 32) rated 12 real or made-up countries (Poland, Vietnam, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Mauritania, Niger, Latvia, Azerbaijan, Singapore, Oman, Yoralia (made-up), Tajikistan) 
on affect and familiarity. A feeling thermometer (0 = very negative, 100 = very positive) assessed 
general affect toward each country. Two countries received mean ratings that were very close to 
the midpoint of the scale (Eritrea M = 55.19, SD = 21.01, Mauritania M = 53.57, SD = 19.85); 
the mean difference was not significant, p >.42). On a rating scale (1 = I’ve never heard of it, 2 = 
I’ve heard of it but don’t know where it is, 3 = I’ve heard of it and know where it is), the same 
two countries were rated as unfamiliar (Eritrea M = 1.62, SD = 0.90, Mauritania M = 1.43, SD = 
0.69; the mean difference was not significant, p >.18). Eritrea and Mauritania were chosen as the 
target countries for being affectively neutral and unfamiliar; this ensured that participants in the 
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main study would be unlikely to have pre-existing knowledge of or feelings about these 
countries. Complete pre-testing results are reported in Table 1. 
Conditioning Procedure 
Cover story. The experimenter told participants the study was about attention and 
vigilance, and gave them instructions for a video surveillance task described as testing the skills 
a security guard needs “to be alert and ready to respond to intruders.” Participants viewed a rapid 
stream of images and words and were given the task of pushing the space bar whenever a 
designated country name appeared on the screen. This task was designed to distract participants 
from focusing on the countries Eritrea and Mauritania but also to ensure that participants were 
attending to the stimuli. The distracter country names that participants searched for were: 
Moldova, Slovenia, Oman, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. Each country name appeared 10 times 
and participants searched for a different country name in each block of the experiment. On some 
trials, the country name appeared on-screen alone, and on other trials it was paired with either a 
neutral image or a neutral word.  
Procedural details. SuperLab 4.0 stimulus presentation software was used for the 
experiment. Participants were presented with 430 screens of information, broken down into five 
experimental blocks. Stimulus materials were presented for 1500 ms each on Dell Optiplex 755 
Minitowers, with Dell E207WFPc monitors and a refresh rate of 85Hz. Participants were seated 
approximately 18 inches away from the computer screen, which was positioned at eye-level. The 
entire conditioning phase lasted about 12 minutes. 
Across all five blocks, there were 40 critical trials (8 per block) involving the target 
countries (20 trials involving Eritrea and 20 involving Mauritania) in which positive-affect 
stimuli were consistently paired with one country, and negative-affect stimuli were consistently 
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paired with the other country. In one condition, Eritrea was paired with positive stimuli and 
Mauritania was paired with negative stimuli; in the other condition, the pairings were reversed. 
The unconditioned stimuli paired with Eritrea and Mauritania for the critical trials were: Ten 
negative  and ten positive images (see Appendix A), and ten negative and ten positive words (see 
Appendix B). Stimulus images were selected from the International Affective Picture System 
database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005) and words were selected based on pre-testing from 
our lab (N = 35). 
In each block of the experiment, the country names Eritrea and Mauritania appeared 4 
times each (2 times paired with a positive-affect or negative-affect image and 2 times paired with 
a positive- or negative-affect word). Interspersed among these critical conditioning trials were 10 
trials of the distracter country names which prompted a participant response, 16 trials of blank 
screens, and 52 trials of affectively neutral filler stimuli that were not paired with either Eritrea 
or Mauritania (see Appendix C). Sometimes a filler stimulus appeared on-screen alone, and 
sometimes it was paired with another filler stimulus. All stimulus words and images were 
presented only once (duration of 1500 ms) during the entire experiment.  
Dependent Measures 
Stereotype traits. After completing the affective conditioning procedure, participants 
were presented with a list of 25 trait words. Sixteen traits reflected the warmth dimension 
(friendly, warm, good-natured, courteous, liars, stubborn, happy, quarrelsome, threatening, 
quick-tempered, generous, conceited, trustworthy, humorless, sincere, and arrogant; α = .94); 
nine traits reflected the competence dimension (lazy, messy, capable, skillful, intelligent, 
confident, competent, efficient, and physically clean; α = .85). Stereotype content dimensions 
were confirmed by factor analysis. Participants were asked to indicate whether each trait was 
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more descriptive of people from Eritrea or Mauritania on a forced-choice, binary response scale. 
Warmth and competence traits were intermixed and presented in random order. After reverse-
scoring negative items, separate warmth and competence stereotype indices were computed, 
representing the proportion of warmth- and competence-relevant trait terms ascribed to each 
group. 
Affective ratings. In order to assess the success of the affective conditioning 
manipulation, participants rated their feelings toward each of the countries (including the five 
distracter countries participants were searching for as well as Eritrea and Mauritania) whose 
names appeared during the five blocks of trials (0 = very negative,100 = very positive).  
Affective ratings were assessed last. The order in which countries were rated was randomized 
across participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Affective Ratings 
Analyses on ratings of Eritrea and Mauritania revealed only the expected interaction 
(counterbalanced main effect) of the affective manipulation and within-participants assessment 
of country rated, indicating more negative feelings toward the country paired with negative 
stimuli (M = 51.11, SD = 26.13) compared to the country paired with positive stimuli (M = 
59.48, SD = 23.50), F(1, 103) = 5.21, p = .025, η = .22. These results indicate that the 
manipulation was successful.
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Stereotypes 
A 2 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the stereotype content indices. The 
between-participants factor was Country Paired with Negative Stimuli (Eritrea or Mauritania), 
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which constituted the manipulation of affect. The within-participants factor was stereotype 
endorsement along two distinct Stereotype Content Dimensions (warmth, competence).  
There was a main effect of the experimental manipulation, indicating a relatively more 
negative stereotype of the country paired with negative stimuli, F(1,103) = 5.54, p = .020, η = 
.22. This main effect was qualified by an interaction between the manipulation and the 
Stereotype Content Dimension variable, F(1,103) = 6.28, p = .014, η = .24.  
Figure 1 reveals the nature of this interaction. When a country was paired with negative-
affect stimuli, its inhabitants were stereotyped as lower in warmth (M = 6.56, SD = 6.10),
3
 
compared to the inhabitants of the country paired with the positive-affect stimuli (M = 9.77, SD 
= 5.23), F(1,103) = 8.43,  p= .005; η
 
= .28. No such effect was observed on perceived 
competence, F<1, η = .00. Competence stereotypes were endorsed to a similar extent regardless 
of whether a country was paired with negative-affect stimuli (M = 4.17, SD = 2.43) or positive-
affect stimuli (M = 4.62, SD = 2.36). 
 These results demonstrate that the creation of mere prejudice (i.e., a content-free affective 
association) gives rise to content-based stereotypes. ITT suggests that negative stereotypes cause 
prejudice; by contrast, the current data show that prejudice can cause stereotypes. The data 
presented here are also reported in Crandall et al. (2011, Experiment 2). Crandall et al. found that 
stereotypes emerged along the warmth dimension but not the competence dimension across three 
experiments, using both subliminal and supraliminal conditioning methods. That we have 
consistently found null results for competence allows us to rule out the possibility that 
participants were simply matching negative affect to negative trait words, as stereotypes with 
specific content emerged in response to mere prejudice. 
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One explanation for why effects emerged on warmth but not competence is that warmth-
related information carries straightforward implications for behavior (warmth = approach), 
whereas competence-related information can have a variety of behavioral consequences 
depending on additional contextual information. For example, when group members are 
perceived to be friendly, their competence is surely valued and consequently invites approach 
behaviors. By contrast, when group members are perceived to be hostile, competence can be 
dangerous and may instead prescribe behavioral avoidance. Therefore, stereotypes that focus 
specifically on warmth may carry the most straightforward and unambiguous justifications for 
prejudice (addressed more fully in the General Discussion). 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated that prejudice can increase endorsement of negative 
stereotypes in the warmth domain. Although negative stereotypes are considered by ITT to be a 
specific type of threat, Experiment 1 did not directly test the hypothesis that prejudices causes 
heightened perception of threat. Experiment 2 will introduce a measure of perceived threat. An 
additional limitation of Experiment 1 is that it used a forced-choice measure of stereotype traits, 
which introduces statistical dependency among evaluations of the two target groups. In response 
to this concern, dependent measures were assessed with continuous response scales in all 
subsequent experiments. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 focused on the perception of threat and its relation to prejudice. Threat 
perception is an integral component of self-protective (or group-protective) strategies that is 
readily activated in intergroup contexts. ITT suggests that “the essence of threat is the fear of 
negative consequences” (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 27). The theory assumes that the 
anticipation of negative consequences (i.e., threat perception) causes prejudiced responses, 
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though an equally plausible prediction is that the activation of prejudice makes threat perception 
more likely to occur. Prejudice is likely to cause perception of threat because potential negative 
outcomes are consistent with felt negative affect, and hence, may be more accessible than 
potential positive outcomes. Threat can cause prejudice (e.g., L. M. Jackson & Esses, 2000; 
Stephan et al., 2005), and the primary goal of Experiment 2 was to reverse the direction of 
causality proposed by ITT, to determine whether prejudice might also cause perception of threat. 
Experiment 2 used the same affective conditioning procedure as in Experiment 1 to 
create content-free affective associations with the unfamiliar social groups Eritrea and 
Mauritania. A new dependent measure, perceived threat, was assessed following the activation of 
negative affect. This measure combines cognitive and behavioral facets of threat including the 
belief that the group is threatening and comfort with intergroup contact. Experiment 1’s measure 
of stereotype trait endorsement assessed perceptions of warmth and competence, which are 
abstract qualities that may not directly capture the concept of threat as articulated by ITT. If the 
essence of threat is the anticipation of negative consequences, then threat—unlike warmth and 
competence—bears a certain immediacy that often comes from actual or anticipated intergroup 
contact. Thus Experiment 2 used a measure of perceived threat that incorporated social distance 
items, which required that participants imagine the possibility of interacting with members of the 
group being evaluated. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 75 undergraduates (49 women) at the University of Kansas from the 
introductory psychology subject pool. They received course credit for participating in the study. 
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Conditioning Procedure 
The conditioning procedure and cover story were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. 
Dependent Measures 
 Perceived threat scale. Following the conditioning procedure, participants completed 
the primary dependent measure of perceived threat. Each of the groups was rated within-
participants. The three-item scale (α = .67, .62 for Eritrea and Mauritania, respectively) included 
the following items: “How threatening are Eritreans (Mauritanians) likely to seem to their 
neighbors? (1 = not at all threatening, 7 = extremely threatening),” “I would like Eritreans 
(Mauritanians) to move into my neighborhood [reversed],” and “Eritreans (Mauritanians) are the 
kind of people I tend to avoid” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The latter two of 
these items were adapted from Crandall’s (1991) adaptation of the Bogardus social distance 
scale (Bogardus, 1933). The order in which countries were rated (Eritrea first or Mauritania first) 
was varied across the three threat scale items. Items were presented in the same order for all 
participants. 
 Affective ratings. Affective ratings were assessed last, using the same scale as used in 
Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
Affective Ratings 
Analyses on ratings of Eritrea and Mauritania revealed only the expected interaction 
(counterbalanced main effect) of the affective manipulation and the within-participants 
assessment of country rated, indicating more negative feelings toward the country paired with 
negative stimuli (M = 51.25, SD = 19.78) compared to the country paired with positive stimuli 
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(M = 56.98, SD = 18.86), F(1, 73) =5.88, p =.018, η =.27. These results indicate that the 
manipulation was successful. 
Perceived Threat 
A 2 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the perceived threat scale. The 
between-subjects factor was Country Paired with Negative Stimuli (Eritrea or Mauritania), 
which constituted the manipulation of affect. The within-subjects factor was Country Rated 
(Eritrea, Mauritania). Results revealed only a significant interaction (counterbalanced main 
effect) between the manipulation of affect and Country Rated, F(1, 73) = 5.49, p = .02, η = .26. 
When a country was paired with negative-affect stimuli, its inhabitants were perceived as more 
threatening (M = 3.42, SD =1.37) compared to when a country was paired with positive-affect 
stimuli (M = 3.06, SD =1.16). In the absence of any information about the countries, associating 
a country with negative affect resulted in its inhabitants being perceived as more threatening and 
more like the kind of people that ought to be avoided, compared to when a country was 
associated with positive affect. 
Analysis of the single item from the perceived threat scale that taps the cognitive rather 
than behavioral component of threat perception (“How threatening are Eritreans (Mauritanians) 
likely to seem to their neighbors?”) revealed the same pattern of results. The expected interaction 
(counterbalanced main effect) between the manipulation of affect and Country Rated was 
significant, F(1, 73) = 4.06, p < .05, η = .23. 
The creation of a mere affective association with a social group caused new perceptions 
of threat posed by that group to emerge. ITT suggests that threat causes prejudice; Experiment 2 
tested the reverse causal model and demonstrated that prejudice can cause heightened perception 
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of threat. Perceptions of threat emerged after the activation of negative affect, in the absence of 
any content-based information about the groups. 
These findings are consistent with the idea that threat perception provides an acceptable 
justification for prejudice. In intergroup situations, one may become aware of negative feelings 
toward the outgroup before having formed an explanation for why one has such feelings. 
Unexplained prejudice is uncomfortable for the perceiver because it is at odds with egalitarian 
ideals and social norms of non-prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Threat perception that is 
consistent with affective reactions (bad groups are threatening; good groups are non-threatening) 
minimizes psychological tension and helps to maintain balance (Heider, 1958). Thus threat 
perception is a likely outcome when prejudiced feelings are activated because it can provide the 
perceiver with an acceptable justification for prejudice. 
ITT suggests that threat reflects the fear of negative consequences; threat posed by 
another group becomes an immediate concern when one anticipates intergroup contact. 
Participants in Experiment 2 were more likely to perceive members of the target group as 
threatening after the activation of negative affect toward that group. This emergent threat 
perception reflects concern over potential negative consequences of the anticipated contact, 
sparked by the suggestion that members of the group might move into the neighborhood. 
Perceiving the group as threatening may be an acceptable explanation for the affect-driven 
inclination to stay away from members of the disliked group. Findings from Experiment 2 
suggest that threat perception can be constructed in response to a mere affective association—
perhaps even without conscious awareness—as justification for prejudice. 
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Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 found that newly created prejudice leads to a reliable pattern of 
cognitive responses—increased stereotyping in the dimension of warmth but not competence, 
and heightened perception of threat. One might infer that these effects will in turn direct 
behavioral responses, with unfriendly and threatening groups being more likely to be avoided. 
IET (Mackie et al., 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993) and the sociofunctional approach to prejudice 
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) propose that affective reactions direct 
intergroup behavior. Cottrell and Neuberg have named their framework the sociofunctional 
approach because its focus is on how threat evokes functionally relevant emotions. For example, 
the theory predicts that fear motivates escape-oriented behaviors, disgust motivates avoidance-
oriented behaviors, and anger motivates aggressive behaviors. 
Both IET and the sociofunctional approach assume that cognitive appraisal of threat has 
temporal and causal precedence in evoking the affective reactions that guide behavior.  
Experiment 3 tested the reverse causal model to determine whether prejudiced affect has a direct 
effect on behavioral response tendencies that is independent of threat perception. In contrast to 
cognitively-oriented theories, an affective primacy perspective conceptualizes stereotyping and 
threat perception as mediators of the effect of affect on behavior. Experiment 3 tested the 
meditational hypothesis that prejudice directs behavioral response tendencies through emerging 
stereotypes and perceptions of threat. Experiment 2 used an exploratory measure of perceived 
threat for which construct validity has not been established. In effort to improve measurement of 
the construct, Experiment 3 adapted a measure of perceived threat from an empirically validated 
scale (Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & Thalhammar, 1992). 
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The pattern of stereotypes found in Experiment 1 might reasonably be accounted for by 
the relative clarity of behavioral implications provided by warmth-related information compared 
to competence-related information. Warmth carries straightforward behavioral implications 
(warmth = approach), whereas competence can have a variety of behavioral implications 
depending on the context. For example, a competent group might wisely be approached if they 
are also perceived to be friendly, but a competent enemy surely warrants avoidance.  It seems 
plausible that prejudice would cause stereotypes of warmth to emerge more readily than 
stereotypes of competence, because warmth is unambiguous in its behavioral implications, but 
this explanation was not empirically tested in Experiment 1. Thus the primary goal of 
Experiment 3 was to test the hypothesis that a newly created prejudice affects behavioral 
response tendencies. Three different categories of behavioral response tendency were measured: 
approach behaviors, avoidance behaviors, and aggressive behaviors. These three categories map 
onto the action tendencies described by the sociofunctional theory. Additionally, Experiment 3 
sought to replicate the pattern of results from previous experiments with a continuous measure of 
stereotype trait endorsement assessing three stereotype content dimensions: warmth-relevant, 
competence-relevant, and threat-relevant traits. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 88 undergraduates (58 women) at the University of Kansas from the 
introductory psychology subject pool. They received course credit for participating in the study.  
Pre-testing of Target Countries 
The same pre-testing sample reported in Experiment 1 (see Table 1) was used to select a 
different pair of target countries for Experiment 3, in order to determine whether the previous 
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findings could be replicated with a different set of countries. Two countries received mean affect 
ratings that were very close to the midpoint of the scale (Azerbaijan M = 55.17, SD = 19.39, 
Mauritania M = 53.57, SD = 19.85); the mean difference was not significant, p >.57. On a rating 
scale (1 = I’ve never heard of it, 2 = I’ve heard of it but don’t know where it is, 3 = I’ve heard of 
it and know where it is), the same two countries were rated as unfamiliar (Azerbaijan M = 1.82, 
SD = 0.72, Mauritania M = 1.43, SD = 0.69; the mean difference was not significant, p >.05). 
Azerbaijan and Mauritania were chosen as the target countries for Experiment 3. 
Evaluative Conditioning Procedure 
The conditioning procedure and cover story were exactly the same as in Experiments 1 
and 2, except that Azerbaijan replaced Eritrea as one of the target countries, and Eritrea replaced 
Azerbaijan as one of the five country names participants searched for in the video surveillance 
task. In addition, I selected the set of the positive and negative words used in the conditioning 
procedure from the Affective Norms for English Words database (Bradley & Lang, 1999; see 
Appendix B). 
Dependent Measures 
Experiment 3 introduced a new measure of stereotype traits that used a continuous rather 
than forced-choice response scale. A new stereotype content dimension, threat-relevant traits, 
was also introduced in Experiment 3, as well as a measure of behavioral response tendencies. 
Affective ratings. In contrast to previous experiments, affective ratings were assessed 
first. Participants completed the same affective rating scale used in Experiments 1-2. 
Stereotype traits. Immediately following the affective rating scales, participants were 
presented with a series of paired stereotype traits which they rated on 7-point semantic 
differential scales. Five pairs of traits reflected the warmth dimension (unfriendly-friendly, 
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insincere-sincere, not warm-warm, dishonest-honest, selfish-generous; α = .80), five pairs of 
traits reflected the competence (lazy-hardworking, messy-neat, incapable-capable, unconfident-
confident, incompetent-competent; α=.90), and five pairs of traits comprised a threat dimension 
(safe-dangerous, good-bad, non-threatening- threatening, nonviolent-violent, trustworthy-cannot 
be trusted; α=.84). Warmth and competence traits were adapted to the semantic differential 
format from the stereotype measure used in Experiment 1. Threat-relevant traits were adapted 
from the perceived threat scale (Avery et al., 1992). The order in which countries were rated 
(Azerbaijan first or Mauritania first) was randomized across participants. For ratings of each 
country, stereotype traits were intermixed across the three content dimensions and presented in 
random order. Separate warmth, competence, and threat stereotype indices were computed for 
Azerbaijan and Mauritania, representing endorsement of warmth-relevant, competence-relevant, 
and threat-relevant traits for each group. 
Behavioral response tendencies. Behavioral response tendencies were assessed last. 
Participants indicated their anticipated behavioral responses, after being asked to consider how 
they might react if they were to meet immigrants from the countries Azerbaijan and Mauritania 
face to face. I adapted a measure of behavioral response tendencies from Lalljee, Tam, 
Hewstone, Laham, and Lee (2009). Three items (α = .41) assessed approach tendencies (“Find 
out more about them,” “Spend time with them,” “Talk to them”), three items (α = .85) assessed 
avoidant tendencies (“Keep them at a distance,” “Have nothing to do with them,” “Avoid 
them”), and three items (α = .55) assessed aggressive tendencies (“Oppose them,” “Confront 
them,” “Argue with them”), on a 7-point scale (1 = definitely would not react this way, 7 = 
definitely would react this way). The order in which countries were rated (Azerbaijan first or 
Mauritania first) was randomized across participants. For ratings of each country, items were 
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intermixed across the three categories of behavioral response tendency and presented in random 
order. 
Results and Discussion 
Affective Ratings 
Analyses on ratings of Azerbaijan and Mauritania revealed a trend for more negative 
feelings to be reported for the country paired with negative stimuli (M = 53.01, SD = 22.69) 
compared to the country paired with positive stimuli (M = 56.38, SD = 21.76), F(1, 86) = 1.64, p 
= .20, η = .14. The modest effect size is somewhat smaller than effects from previous 
experiments using a similar conditioning procedure (ηs = .22, .27). This may be due to the 
increased length of the dependent measures; the effects of this type of conditioning manipulation 
are known to fade quickly (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Because the manipulation significantly 
affected the dependent measures assessed immediately following the conditioning procedure, it 
is likely that the manipulation of affect was successful in creating new affective associations with 
the groups although the strength of this association had diminished by the end of the 
experimental session. 
Behavioral Response Tendencies 
A 2 X 3 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted on behavioral response tendencies. 
The between-subjects factor was Country Paired with Negative Stimuli (Azerbaijan or 
Mauritania), which constituted the manipulation of affect. The within-subjects factors were 
Behavioral Response Tendency (approach, avoid, aggress) and Country Rated (Azerbaijan, 
Mauritania). There was a three-way interaction between the manipulation, Behavioral Response 
Tendency and Country Rated, F(2, 172) = 5.88, p = .003, η = .25. 
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Figure 2 reveals the nature of this interaction; means and correlations among the 
behavioral response tendencies are reported in Table 2. When a country was paired with negative 
stimuli participants were less likely to approach immigrants from that country, F(1,86) = 8.86, p 
= .004, η = .30, and more likely to anticipate behaving aggressively toward immigrants from that 
country, F(1,86) = 6.48, p = .01, η = .26. The manipulation had no effect on avoidance 
behaviors, F(1,86) = 0.28, p = .60, η= .05. These results show that newly created prejudice 
increased aggressive response tendencies and decreased approach-oriented response tendencies, 
providing new evidence that mere prejudice directs anticipated behavioral responses. 
Stereotypes 
A 2 X 3 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the stereotype content indices. The 
between-subjects factor was Country Paired with Negative Stimuli (Azerbaijan or Mauritania), 
which constituted the manipulation of affect. The within-subjects factors were Stereotype 
Content Dimension (warmth, competence, threat) and Country Rated (Azerbaijan, Mauritania). 
There was a three-way interaction between the manipulation, Stereotype Content Dimension and 
Country Rated, F(2, 172) = 4.94, p = .008, η = .23.  
Figure 3 reveals the nature of this interaction; means and correlations among the 
stereotype content dimensions are reported in Table 3. When a country was paired with negative 
stimuli, its inhabitants were stereotyped as lower in warmth, compared to the inhabitants of the 
country paired with the positive stimuli, F(1, 86) = 5.54, p = .02; η = .25. The effect on 
perceived competence was relatively smaller, F(1, 86) = 3.57, p = .06, η = .20. When a country 
was paired with negative stimuli its inhabitants were stereotyped as more threatening, compared 
to the inhabitants of the country paired with the positive stimuli, F(1, 86) = 4.18, p = .04; η = 
.21. The data from Experiment 3 replicated the pattern of findings from Experiments 1 and 2, 
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combining the effects for stereotypes and threat into a single measure of warmth-relevant, 
competence-relevant, and threat-relevant traits. 
Meta-Analysis  
Fixed-effects meta-analysis was used to compare the conditioning manipulation’s effects 
on ratings of warmth, competence, and threat in Experiments 1-3. The type of effect size used 
was the standardized mean gain (ESsg), the appropriate statistic for repeated measures designs 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). The mean weighted effect size was significant for warmth (ESsg = .23) 
and threat (ESsg = .23), but not significant for competence (ESsg = .17). Across three experiments 
(N = 268), stereotypes in the dimension of warmth but not competence, and threat perception 
(threat-relevant stereotypes) emerged after the creation of a mere affective association with an 
unfamiliar social group. 
Mediational Analyses 
I used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping macro to test the stereotype content 
dimensions of warmth, competence, and threat as potential mediators of the effect of the 
conditioning manipulation on behavioral response tendencies. I tested separate models for the 
three types of behavioral responses. Because stereotype trait ratings and behavioral response 
tendencies were assessed as repeated measures (i.e., participants rated both Azerbaijan and 
Mauritania), these models tested the effects of the manipulation on ratings of one country while 
controlling for the within-participant ratings of the other country.
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As shown in Figure 4a, the manipulation affected threat-relevant stereotype traits (β = 
.57, p = .03), warmth stereotypes (β = -.44, p = .03), competence stereotypes (β = -.43, p = .02), 
and decreased approach-oriented behaviors (β = -.82, p = .002). The manipulation’s effect on 
approach-oriented behaviors was substantially reduced after controlling for stereotype traits (β = 
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-.51, p = .03). The results with 1000 bootstrap samples indicated that the indirect effect of the 
conditioning manipulation on approach-oriented behaviors through threat-relevant traits was 
significant, with a 95% confidence interval of -.57 to -.01. The conditioning manipulation 
increased endorsement of threat-relevant stereotypes, which in turn decreased approach-oriented 
response tendencies. The indirect effects of conditioning on approach behaviors through warmth 
and competence stereotypes were not significant. 
As shown in Figure 4b, the manipulation was positively but nonsignificantly
5
 related to 
avoidance behaviors (β = .31, p = .28). The manipulation’s effect on avoidance behaviors was 
substantially reduced after controlling for stereotype traits (β = .02, p = .93). The results with 
1000 bootstrap samples indicated that the indirect effect of the conditioning manipulation on 
avoidance behaviors through warmth stereotypes was significant, with a 95% confidence interval 
of .06 to 1.00. The conditioning manipulation decreased endorsement of warmth stereotypes, 
which in turn increased avoidance-oriented response tendencies. The indirect effects of 
conditioning on avoidance behaviors through threat-relevant traits and competence stereotypes 
were not significant. 
As shown in Figure 4c, the manipulation also had a significant effect on aggressive 
response tendencies (β = .39, p < .05). The manipulation’s effect on aggressive response 
tendencies was only slightly reduced after controlling for stereotype traits (β = .30, p = .14). The 
results with 1000 bootstrap samples indicated that the indirect effects of conditioning on 
aggressive behaviors through stereotypes were not significant for any of the three stereotype 
content dimensions. The conditioning manipulation increased aggressive response tendencies, 
but this effect was not mediated by stereotype trait endorsement. 
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IET and the sociofunctional approach to prejudice assume that cognitive appraisal of 
threat is a necessary precursor to experiencing an affective reaction, suggesting that affect 
mediates the relationship between threat and behavior. I tested the reverse causal models 
suggested by these theories, using affective ratings rather than the experimental manipulation as 
the proposed mediator of the relationship between stereotypes and behavioral responses. I tested 
a series of models (nine in all) with stereotypes of warmth, competence or threat as the 
independent variable, affect as the proposed mediator, and approach, avoidance, or aggressive 
responses as the dependent variable (see Figure 5). Table 4 reports the results with 1000 
bootstrap samples for the test of the indirect effect of affect hypothesized by IET and the 
sociofunctional approach. The indirect effect of affect was not significant for any of the nine 
models tested. 
Findings from Experiment 3 show that prejudiced affect influenced behavioral response 
tendencies, in an experimental context in which stereotype endorsement and perception of threat 
were unlikely to have preceded the activation of negative affect. Furthermore, the results suggest 
that the effect of prejudice on anticipated social behavior can be explained by cognitive 
processes such as stereotyping and perception of threat. The effect of conditioned prejudice on 
approach-oriented behaviors was mediated by threat-relevant stereotype traits, and the effect of 
conditioned prejudice on avoidance behaviors was mediated by warmth stereotypes. By 
comparison, the effect of conditioned prejudiced on aggressive behaviors was not mediated by 
stereotype endorsement. The reverse causal models were not supported by the data. 
Together, these results are consistent with the perspective that affective responses 
temporally precede and causally influence cognitive responses (Dijker, 1987; Jussim et al., 1995; 
Pryor et al., 1999; Zajonc, 1980). In intergroup situations, knowing how we feel about a group is 
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enough to influence how we behave toward the group. Stereotypes and perception of threat may 
emerge after the activation of negative affect, perhaps because they provide the perceiver an 
acceptable justification for prejudice. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 focused on specific emotions involved in prejudice and tested the 
hypothesis that disgust and fear are associated with unique patterns of cognitive and behavioral 
responses. Intergroup emotions theory (IET; Mackie et al., 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993) and the 
sociofunctional approach to prejudice (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) both focus on how specific 
emotions in intergroup contexts are associated with specific kinds of threat and behavioral 
responses. Both theories propose a single causal pathway from threat appraisal to specific 
emotions involved in prejudice, which in turn direct behavior. By contrast, Experiment 4 tested a 
model in which specific emotional reactions to social groups temporally precede and causally 
influence threat perception and behavioral response tendencies. 
Affective reactions in intergroup contexts encompass a whole range of specific emotions, 
such as disgust, anger, fear, contempt, guilt, envy, admiration, and pity. Many of these emotions 
have been studied from an IET or sociofunctional perspective, though neither theory makes any 
claims about this list being comprehensive. I selected disgust and fear as the targeted negative 
emotions in Experiment 4 for two main reasons. First, previous research suggests potentially 
different behavioral responses for disgust and fear. From an evolutionary perspective, fear 
promotes behavioral avoidance and thus facilitates escape from potential harm (e.g., Carver, 
2001; Frijida, 1986; Ohman, 1993). Schaller and Duncan (2007) argue that disgust also 
motivates avoidance as part of the behavioral immune system’s effort to avoid parasites and 
disease—a response that is immediate, impulsive, and probably not consciously considered. 
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They note that the more planful actions that are required to address long-term threats require the 
involvement of higher-order cognitive processes. Therefore, disgust may motivate other 
behavioral responses such as aggression, depending on intervening cognitions, which could 
include perception of threat. 
The second reason disgust and fear were targeted is that previous research suggests the 
two emotions will be associated with different kinds of threat. Realistic threats reflect concern 
over the ingroup’s safety and welfare, whereas symbolic threats reflect concern that cherished 
morals and values are being violated (Stephan et al., 1999). Disgust is more likely to signal 
symbolic threat, as disgust has been shown to increase moral judgment (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2008; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). By comparison, fear is more likely to 
signal realistic threat given that fear is usually triggered by the detection of potential harm 
(Ohman, 1993). 
If disgust and fear prompt different kinds of threat perception, then they are likely to be 
associated with different behavioral responses. For example, symbolic threat has been shown to 
predict aggressive behaviors (Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 2010; Talley & 
Bettencourt, 2008). By contrast, perceived realistic threat to the majority group’s status has been 
shown to increase same-race voting preference (Bohm, Funke, & Harth, 2010; c.f., Kinder & 
Sears, 1981), which could indicate either an approach-oriented response to the ingroup or an 
avoidant response to the outgroup. 
Based on the research described above, Experiment 4 tested several predictions regarding 
the effects of disgust and fear on threat perception and behavioral response tendencies. Fear was 
predicted to increase realistic threat and avoidant response tendencies, and to decrease approach-
oriented response tendencies.  Disgust was predicted to increase symbolic threat and aggressive 
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response tendencies. Experiment 4 also tested the hypothesized meditational models in which the 
effects of fear and disgust on behavioral responses are mediated by perceived realistic and 
symbolic threat, respectively. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 95 (56 women) individuals recruited from the University of Kansas and 
from the Lawrence, Kansas community. They each received ten dollars for participating in the 
study; participant payments were funded by a Grants-in-Aid dissertation award from the Society 
for Psychological Study of Social Issues. 
Pre-testing of Stimuli 
 A separate sample of 74 participants rated pictures from the International Affective 
Picture System database (Lang et al., 2005) database selected to evoke the specific emotions of 
disgust or fear. Participants rated one of two sets of 33 pictures, indicating for each how much 
the image made them feel disgusted, angry, discouraged, fearful, interested, or happy (1 = not at 
all, 5 = very much so) using items from the differential emotions scale (Izard, Libero, Putnam, & 
Haynes, 1993; see Appendix D). From these results I selected ten disgust-provoking images and 
ten fear-provoking images (see Appendix A) for use in Experiment 4. 
 A second pre-test sample of 42 participants rated a set of 32 words, indicating for each 
how much the word made them feel disgusted, angry, discouraged, fearful, interested, or happy 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much so). Selection of stimuli was based on the criteria that the image or 
word had high ratings (above the midpoint of the scale) on the targeted emotion and low ratings 
(below the midpoint of the scale) on the other five emotions assessed. From these results I 
selected ten disgust-provoking words and ten fear-provoking words (see Appendix B). 
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Evaluative Conditioning Procedure 
The conditioning procedure and cover story were exactly the same as in Experiments 1 
and 2, except that the disgust-provoking or fear-provoking stimuli selected in pre-testing were 
used instead of the negative-affect stimuli used previously. Eritrea and Mauritania were the 
target countries. 
Experimental design. Two between-subjects factors were varied—Negative Emotion 
Targeted (disgust or fear) and Country Paired with Negative Stimuli (Eritrea or Mauritania)—
resulting in four experimental conditions: (1) Eritrea paired with disgust-provoking stimuli and 
Mauritania paired with positive-affect stimuli, (2) Mauritania paired with disgust-provoking 
stimuli and Eritrea paired with positive-affect stimuli, (3) Eritrea paired with fear-provoking 
stimuli and Mauritania paired with positive-affect stimuli, and (4) Mauritania paired with fear-
provoking stimuli and Eritrea paired with positive-affect stimuli. One could think of this 
experiment as two “mini” studies: Experiment 4A (disgust compared to positive-affect control) 
and Experiment 4B (fear compared to positive-affect control). 
A second instantiation of conditioning was also added in Experiment 4 due to the 
extended length of the dependent measures. The second conditioning phase repeated the first two 
blocks of trials from the initial conditioning phase. Participants were told that the second 
(shorter) round of the video surveillance task was an opportunity to improve their score. 
Immediately following the second conditioning phase, all participants received the same (bogus) 
feedback that they had improved their score in the second round. 
Dependent Measures 
 Affective ratings. Immediately following the first conditioning phase, participants 
completed the same affective rating scales used in Experiments 1-3.  Participants next completed 
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items from the differential emotions scale (Izard et al., 1993) measuring how much Eritrean and 
Mauritanian immigrants made them feel disgust, fear, enjoyment, and anger (see Appendix D). 
The order in which countries were rated (Eritrea first or Mauritania first) was randomized across 
participants, and the order of presentation of the six emotion items was randomized within 
country.  
Stereotype traits. Next participants completed the same measures of stereotype traits 
used in Experiment 3.  
 Realistic and symbolic threat scales. Immeditaely following the second conditioning 
phase, participants reported perceived threat posed by each of the groups with items adapted 
from the realistic and symbolic threat scales (Stephan et al., 1999). Four items (α = .84) 
measured realistic threat; four items (α = .85) measured symbolic threat (see Appendix D). 
Eritrea and Mauritania were rated within-participants using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The order in which countries were rated (Eritrea first or Mauritania 
first) was randomized across participants. For ratings of each country, realistic and symbolic 
threat items were intermixed and presented in random order. 
Behavioral response tendencies. Behavioral response tendencies were assessed last, 
using the same measure as used in Experiment 3. 
Results and Discussion 
Affective Ratings 
When disgust was the emotion targeted in the conditioning procedure, analyses on 
affective ratings of Eritrea and Mauritania revealed a significant effect for more negative feelings 
to be reported for the country paired with negative stimuli (M = 53.58, SD = 19.86) compared to 
the country paired with positive stimuli (M = 58.71, SD = 18.28), F(1, 45) = 4.54, p = .039, η 
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=.20. When fear was the emotion targeted (F < 1), affective ratings toward a country did not 
significantly differ for the country paired with negative stimuli (M = 51.73, SD = 18.19) and the 
country paired with positive stimuli (M = 53.61, SD = 17.94). These results indicate that the 
manipulation of disgust had a stronger effect on general affective evaluations of the groups than 
did the manipulation of fear. 
Disgust manipulation. Analyses on emotion scales revealed a significant effect of the 
disgust manipulation such that participant ratings of disgust were higher when a country was 
paired with disgust-provoking stimuli (M = 1.47, SD = 0.99) compared to when a country was 
paired with positive-affect stimuli (M = 1.17, SD = 0.49), F(1, 45) = 5.82, p = .02, η =.33. The 
disgust manipulation had no significant effect on participant ratings of fear, F(1, 45) = 1.66, p = 
.21, η =.19. Participants experienced about the same amount of fear when a country was paired 
with disgust-provoking (M = 1.47, SD = 0.84) or positive-affect stimuli (M = 1.32, SD = 0.68). 
Anger (F(1, 45) = 1.62, p = .21, η = .19) and enjoyment (F < 1) were unaffected by the disgust 
manipulation. Pairing a country with disgust-provoking stimuli evoked about the same amount 
of anger (M = 1.52, SD = 0.96) and enjoyment (M = 2.09, SD = 1.09) as pairing a country with 
positive-affect stimuli (Ms = 1.34, 2.18, SDs = 0.88, 1.10 for anger and enjoyment, respectively). 
Fear manipulation. Analyses on emotion scales revealed the fear manipulation did not 
significantly affect participant ratings of fear. Participants experienced only slightly more fear 
associated with a country when it was paired with fear-provoking stimuli (M = 1.42, SD = 0.89) 
compared to when it was paired with positive-affect stimuli (M = 1.23, SD = 0.58), F(1, 46) = 
2.34, p = .13, η =.22. In fact, the fear manipulation had a stronger effect on participant ratings of 
disgust than it had on participant ratings of fear. Participants experienced more disgust when a 
country was paired with fear-provoking (M = 1.34, SD = 0.81) compared to positive-affect 
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stimuli (M = 1.17, SD = 0.38), F(1, 46) = 2.75, p = .10, η =.24. The fear manipulation also 
significantly increased anger, F(1, 46) = 4.83, p = .03, η =.31. Participants experienced more 
anger when a country was paired with fear-provoking (M = 1.42, SD = 0.83) compared to 
positive-affect stimuli (M = 1.21, SD = 0.46). Enjoyment was unaffected by the fear 
manipulation (F < 1). Pairing a country with fear-provoking stimuli evoked about the same 
amount of enjoyment (M = 2.02, SD = 1.07) as pairing a country with positive-affect stimuli (M 
=2.15, SD = 1.13). 
Taken together, these findings indicate that only the manipulation of disgust was 
successful in influencing general affective evaluations and in uniquely priming only the emotion 
targeted. The manipulation of fear failed in both of these respects, and consequently the data 
from these conditions (Experiment 4B) will be excluded from the main analysis (Appendices D 
and E report the results for the fear manipulation). It could be that the disgust manipulation was 
more effective than the fear manipulation in creating new affective associations with Eritrean 
and Mauritanian immigrants because of a pre-existing association between disgust and foreign or 
unfamiliar people, which has been demonstrated in previous research (Navarrete & Fessler, 
2006; Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Schiefenhovel, 1997). In any case, the 
manipulation of fear had a larger effect on disgust (and anger) than on fear, and the manipulation 
thus generates data that is essentially uninterpretable. 
Perception of Threat 
A 2 X 2 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the perception of threat. The 
between-subjects factor was Country Paired with Disgust-provoking Stimuli (Eritrea or 
Mauritania). The within-subjects factors were Threat Type (realistic, symbolic) and Country 
Rated (Eritrea, Mauritania). The two-way interaction of the manipulation and country rated was 
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significant, indicating a main effect of disgust conditioning, F(1, 44) = 7.53, p = .009, η =.38. 
There were no other significant effects or interactions. 
Figure 6 depicts these results; means and correlations among the types of threat 
perception are reported in Table 5. As predicted, when a country was paired with disgust-
provoking stimuli, its inhabitants were perceived to pose more realistic threat compared to when 
it was paired with positive-affect stimuli, t(46) = 2.94, p = .01. In addition, when a country was 
paired with disgust-provoking stimuli, its inhabitants were perceived to pose more symbolic 
threat, t(45) = 2.39, p = .02. Disgust, or an affective association created from pairing disgust-
provoking stimuli with an unfamiliar country name, heightened perception of realistic threat and 
symbolic threat posed by inhabitants of the targeted country. 
Behavioral Response Tendencies 
A 2 X 3 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted on behavioral response tendencies. 
The between-subjects factor was Country Paired with Disgust-provoking Stimuli (Eritrea or 
Mauritania). The within-subjects factors were Behavioral Response Tendency (approach, avoid, 
aggress) and Country Rated (Eritrea, Mauritania). The three-way interaction of the disgust 
manipulation, behavioral response tendency, and country rated was marginally significant, F(2, 
88) = 2.84, p = .06, η =.25. Follow-up tests revealed the simple effect of disgust conditioning 
was significant for aggressive responses (F(1, 44) = 3.99, p = .05, η =.29) but nonsignificant for 
approach-oriented (F(1, 44) = 2.25, p = .14, η =.22) and avoidant responses (F(1, 44) = 1.02, p = 
.32, η =.15). 
Figure 7 depicts these results; means and correlations among the behavioral response 
tendencies are reported in Table 6. As predicted, when a country was paired with disgust-
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provoking stimuli, participants reported being more likely to respond aggressively compared to 
when it was paired with positive-affect stimuli. 
Stereotypes 
A 2 X 3 X 2 mixed model ANOVA was conducted on the stereotypes content indices. 
The between-subjects factor was Country Paired with Disgust-provoking Stimuli (Eritrea or 
Mauritania). The within-subjects factors were Stereotype Content Dimension (warmth, 
competence, threat) and Country Rated (Eritrea, Mauritania). The predicted three-way 
interaction was not significant, F(2, 90) = 2.07, p = .13, η =.21.
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These results fail to replicate 
findings from Experiments 1-3; this is perhaps due to the failure of the fear manipulation and the 
consequent decision to exclude half of the data from analysis. Appendix E reports the 
stereotyping results using the full sample (including data from both the fear conditioning and 
disgust conditioning manipulations). 
Mediational Analyses 
I used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping macro to test realistic and symbolic 
threat as potential mediators of the effects of disgust on behavioral response tendencies. Because 
the pattern of effects was identical (though the direction of effects was opposite) for avoidance 
and approach behaviors, I used a composite variable calculated as avoidance minus approach to 
estimate these models. I tested separate models for the effect of disgust on aggressive behaviors 
and on avoidance-approach behaviors. I used the measured disgust scale as the independent 
variable in the models instead of the experimental manipulation. Because perceived threat and 
behavioral response tendencies were assessed as repeated measures (i.e., participants rated both 
Eritrea and Mauritania), these models tested the effects of negative emotion on ratings of one 
country while controlling for the within-participant ratings of the other country.
7 
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As shown in Figure 8a, disgust had a significant effect on realistic (β = .49, p = .0005) 
and symbolic threat (β = .66, p < .00005). The more participants felt disgusted, the more threat 
they perceived; the effect was especially strong for symbolic threat. Disgust also had a 
significant effect on avoidance-approach behaviors (β = .52, p = .009). After controlling for 
realistic and symbolic threat, disgust was no longer related to avoidance-approach behaviors (β 
=.01, p = .96). The results with 1000 bootstrap samples indicated that the indirect effect of 
disgust on avoidance-approach response tendencies through realistic threat was significant, with 
a 95% confidence interval of .12 to 1.27. By contrast, the indirect effect of disgust on avoidance-
approach behavior through symbolic threat was not significant (95% confidence interval -.26 to 
.47). The experience of disgust increased perceptions of realistic threat, which in turn increased 
anticipation of avoidance behaviors and decreased anticipation of approach-oriented behaviors.  
As shown in Figure 8b, disgust was positively but nonsignificantly
8
 associated with 
aggressive behaviors (β = .07, p = .42). After controlling for realistic and symbolic threat, disgust 
was negatively associated with aggressive behaviors (β = -.09, p = .29). The results with 1000 
bootstrap samples indicated that the indirect effect of disgust on aggressive response tendencies 
through symbolic threat was significant, with a 95% confidence interval of .08 to .50. By 
contrast, the indirect effect of disgust on aggressive response tendencies through realistic threat 
was not significant (95% confidence interval -.31 to .02). The experience of disgust increased 
perceptions of symbolic threat, which in turn increased anticipation of aggressive behaviors. 
I also tested the reverse causal models (the models consistent with IET and the 
sociofunctional approach), with threat as the independent variable and disgust as the potential 
mediator of its effect on behavioral response tendencies.
9
 I tested separate models (four in all) 
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with realistic threat or symbolic threat as the independent variable, disgust as the mediator, and 
avoidance-approach or aggressive behaviors as the dependent variable. 
As shown in Figure 9a, realistic threat increased disgust (β = .43, p = .0008). But the total 
effect of realistic threat on avoidance-approach behavior (β = .91, p <.00005) remained 
significant after controlling for disgust (β = .79, p = .0002). The indirect effect of realistic threat 
on avoidance-approach behavior was not significant (95% confidence interval -.30 to .80). The 
same pattern of results emerged for the model with symbolic threat as the independent variable. 
Symbolic threat increased disgust (β = .49, p < .00005), but the total effect of symbolic threat on 
avoidance-approach behavior (β = .80, p < .00005) remained significant after controlling for 
disgust (β = .72, p = .0008). The indirect effect of symbolic threat on avoidance-approach 
behavior was not significant (95% confidence interval -.33 to .53). The models suggested by IET 
and the sociofunctional approach were not supported by the data. 
As shown in Figure 9b, symbolic threat increased disgust (β = .50, p < .00005). But the 
total effect of symbolic threat on aggressive behavior (β = .35, p <.00005) remained significant 
after controlling for disgust (β = .39, p = .0001). The indirect effect of symbolic threat on 
aggressive behavior was not significant (95% confidence interval -.27 to .08). The same pattern 
of results emerged for the model with realistic threat as the independent variable. Realistic threat 
increased disgust (β = .44, p = .0007), but the total effect of realistic threat on aggressive 
behavior (β = .24, p = .01) was only slightly reduced after controlling for disgust (β = .18, p = 
.08). The indirect effect of realistic threat on aggressive behavior was not significant (95% 
confidence interval -.12 to .31). Once again, the models suggested by IET and the 
sociofunctional approach were not supported by the data. 
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Findings from Experiment 4 support the hypothesized meditational framework for 
disgust. Disgust was associated with different behavioral responses depending on the specific 
type of threat being perceived. Disgust indirectly increased avoidant tendencies (and decreased 
approach tendencies) through heightened perception of realistic threat. By contrast, disgust 
indirectly increased aggressive responses through heightened perception of symbolic threat. The 
former result is consistent with research linking realistic threat to same-race voting preferences 
(Bohm et al., 2010).  The latter result is consistent with previous research linking disgust to 
moral judgment and aggression (Schnall et al., 2008; Talley & Bettencourt, 2008).  
Taken together, the results of Experiment 4 challenge the assumption made by IET and 
the sociofunctional approach that emotions are the mediators between threat appraisal and 
behavior.  Instead, threat perception mediated the effects of disgust on behavioral response 
tendencies, whereas the reverse causal models were not supported by the data. These findings are 
consistent with the perspective that in intergroup situations, affective responses are primary. 
Newly created, affective associations specific to the emotion disgust caused heightened 
perception of threat, which in turn directed behavioral responses. 
Experiment 4 was unable to support any causal predictions regarding the effect of fear on 
threat perception and behavioral response tendencies due to the failure of the fear conditioning 
manipulation. In fact, the fear manipulation evoked more disgust than fear. It could be that fear is 
often experienced in conjunction with other negative emotions in real social interactions. If this 
is true, experimental tests of the prediction that specific emotions cause specific threats may not 
be externally valid. Alternatively, it could be that associations between disgust and immigrants 
are formed more readily than associations between fear and immigrants, which would be 
consistent with previous work on the behavioral immune system and individual differences in 
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disgust sensitivity (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Schaller & Duncan, 2007). In this case, the 
experimental failure of the fear manipulation may reflect a methodological difficulty inherent to 
studying fear, rather than suggest that the specific emotions hypothesis is untenable or 
unimportant.  
Other methods for experimentally manipulating fear should be investigated in order to 
determine whether the current study’s predictions that fear causally influences realistic threat and 
behavioral avoidance can be supported. Investigating the effects of additional intergroup 
emotions on threat perception and behavioral responses also remains an important direction for 
future research. In particular, anger, unlike most negative emotions, is often associated with 
approach behaviors (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). The hierarchical perspective of affect 
(Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999) alternatively suggests that anger has both a specific and a 
non-specific component, with the former being linked to the appetitive/approach system and the 
latter being linked to the aversive/avoidance motivational system. Disentangling the effects of 
anger’s dual structure in intergroup contexts could be an interesting and worthwhile empirical 
pursuit. Additionally, future studies should incorporate measures of actual behavioral responses 
in order to replicate and extend the results of the current experiment, which measured behavioral 
response tendencies. 
General Discussion 
 Across four experiments I created new prejudices—content-free affective associations 
with unfamiliar social groups—and found that perception of threat emerged as a result of mere 
prejudice. The activation of negative affect heightened threat perception of all kinds, including 
realistic threat, symbolic threat, and threat-relevant stereotype traits. These experiments provide 
new evidence that prejudice causes perception of threat. 
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Conditioned prejudice caused stereotypes to emerge in the dimension of warmth but not 
competence—a pattern consistent with earlier findings (Crandall et al., 2011)—and affected 
behavioral response tendencies. In the absence of content-based information about the groups, 
groups associated with negative affect were perceived to be more dangerous, violent, and 
unfriendly, and were less likely to be approached and more likely to be aggressed against, 
compared to groups associated with positive affect.  
 All four experiments used affective conditioning to create new prejudices, but the exact 
procedures and dependent measures differed somewhat across experiments. Experiment 1 
measured stereotype traits with a forced-choice measure based on ITT’s treatment of negative 
stereotypes as a particular kind of threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Experiment 2 measured 
perceived threat with a continuous measure incorporating both cognitive and behavioral aspects 
of threat. Experiment 3 introduced new target group names, a continuous measure of stereotype 
traits, and behavioral response tendencies. Experiment 4 created the emotionally specific 
affective association of disgust (and attempted to create a fear-specific affective association), and 
measured realistic and symbolic threat, behavioral response tendencies, and stereotype traits. 
Despite these procedural differences, there was a consistent pattern of results across 
experiments: When a country was associated with negative affect its inhabitants were (a) 
stereotyped as relatively cold and threatening, (b) perceived to pose more realistic and symbolic 
threat, and (c) more likely to be targeted for aggression, and less likely to be targeted for 
approach-oriented responses relative to a country associated with positive affect.  
Experiencing disgust in reference to a social group was associated with two possible 
behavioral outcomes: Disgust increased anticipated avoidance (and decreased approach) through 
heightened perception of realistic threat, whereas disgust increased anticipated aggression 
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through heightened perception of symbolic threat. These findings are consistent with the IET 
(Mackie et al., 2000; E. R. Smith, 1993) and sociofunctional approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) prediction that specific kinds of threat perception evoke 
different behavioral responses. However, the current work suggests that emotional reactions 
come before threat perception. 
The hypothesized models in which the effect of affect on behavioral intentions is 
mediated by threat perception outperformed the reverse causal models suggested by IET and the 
sociofunctional approach in which the effect of threat on behavioral intentions is mediated by 
affect. The path from affect to threat was significant for both models, but the path from affect to 
behavior was not significant for the reverse causal models. Affect had a direct effect on behavior 
and a relatively weaker indirect effect. By contrast, threat perception had both a direct effect and 
an indirect effect on behavior. Affect directs behavior through perception of threat, but threat 
perception does not direct behavior through affect.  This suggests that affective reactions are 
relatively more automatic and inflexible in comparison to threat perception. Threat perception 
can be constructed as justification for prejudiced affect, allowing the perceiver to legitimately act 
in accordance with her feelings. But threat’s effect on behavior does not seem to be mediated by 
affect, perhaps because threat perception alone provides sufficient justification for behavioral 
discrimination. Taken together, these results demonstrate that affective reactions in intergroup 
contexts can (and typically do) temporally precede and causally influence perception of threat. 
Why Warmth but not Competence? 
The meta-analysis of stereotyping results from Experiments 1-3 determined that the 
pattern of findings was consistent across experiments: The conditioning manipulation 
significantly affected stereotype endorsement in the dimension of warmth but not in the 
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dimension of competence. What might account for the consistency of the stereotyping results? A 
feelings-as-information perspective (Schwarz, 1990) might argue that a negative affective 
association with a social group provides information about the likely characteristics of that group 
(e.g., negative traits). This sort of matching process implies that any and all negative stereotype 
traits should be endorsed following the activation of negative affect. However, stereotypes 
consistently emerged in the warmth domain and not in the competence domain. Thus it is highly 
unlikely that participants were merely matching negative affect to negative stereotype traits, as 
both warmth and competence are positive evaluative dimensions. 
Both warmth and competence are fundamental dimensions of social perception. 
Evolutionary pressures dictate that in intergroup encounters, people must quickly determine a 
group’s intent (warmth—friend or foe), and their ability to enact that intent (competence—able 
or unable). Yet several conceptual perspectives suggest perceivers place special priority on 
judgments of warmth (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Schaller, 
2008). When forming impressions, people seek out more information related to warmth than to 
competence, and warmth information contributes more to overall impressions than competence 
information (Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Trustworthiness (a central component of 
the warmth dimension) is a valued characteristic for all types of interdependent relationships, 
whereas other characteristics such as intelligence and competence are valued only when they are 
relevant to the specific context of interdependence (Cottrell et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
stereotypes connoting warmth versus coldness are relatively unambiguous in their implications 
for affect and interpersonal behavior: Perceptions of warmth encourage approach-oriented 
behaviors; perceptions of coldness encourage avoidance instead. By contrast, perceptions of 
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competence can have highly variable affective and behavioral implications, depending on 
additional contextual information. 
From an evolutionary perspective, approach-avoidance motivation largely stems from a 
desire to avoid negative consequences and to escape harm (e.g., Schaller & Duncan, 2007). ITT 
suggests that the fear of negative consequences is the essence of threat; threat appraisal directly 
influences approach-avoidance motivation. Threat indicates potential harm and consequently 
signals behavioral avoidance (Carver, 2001; Mackie et al., 2000; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002). The 
Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002) proposes that perceived warmth derives from a 
group’s competitive intent, whereas perceived competence derives from a group’s status. 
Competition is arguably a more explicit indicator of threat than status as both high and low status 
groups could be an ally of one’s own group, whereas only competitive (but not non-competitive) 
groups can be an enemy. 
If warmth-relevant information carries behavioral implications related to approach-
avoidance, it would serve as a marker of threat. Social groups perceived to be warm and friendly 
typically are perceived to pose low levels of threat whereas groups perceived to be cold and 
hostile often are perceived to pose high levels of threat. By contrast, groups perceived to be 
competent could just as easily be perceived to be threatening or non-threatening—depending on 
whether the group is also perceived to have friendly or hostile intent. Indeed, there was a strong 
correlation between judgments of threat and warmth (r = -.84; see Table 3); the correlation 
between threat and competence was comparatively moderate (r = -.66). 
Threat as Justification for Prejudice 
In the present research warmth-relevant and threat-relevant stereotypes emerged as 
correlated outcomes of prejudice, but competence-relevant stereotypes were relatively less 
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affected by the affective manipulation. Additionally, conditioned prejudice directed behavioral 
responses tendencies. This evidence is consistent with the argument that warmth stereotypes and 
perceptions of threat (relatively) unambiguously direct behavior, yet only meditational analysis 
can provide a direct test of the hypothesis. Indeed, the effect of the conditioning manipulation on 
behavioral response tendencies was mediated by heightened perception of threat. Conditioned 
prejudice caused threat-relevant stereotypes (Experiment 3) and heightened perception of 
realistic threat (Experiment 4), which in turn directed behavioral response tendencies by 
increasing avoidant tendencies and decreasing approach tendencies. These results provide initial 
empirical support for the idea that stereotypes that function in concert with threat detection—i.e., 
warmth-relevant and threat-relevant traits—may provide the most immediate and efficient 
justifications for prejudice. 
I propose that perception of threat emerged as a consequence of negative affective 
associations because threat provides perceivers with a compelling justification for the experience 
of prejudice. A threat-as-justification perspective resonates with other psychological theories of 
cognitive consistency and balance (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). Perception of threat may be 
especially effective in helping individuals maintain a subjective sense of consistency between 
felt affective associations with a target group and connotative beliefs about that group.  
This kind of justification process is also consistent with the justification-suppression 
model of prejudice expression (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). According to the JSM, social 
norms of equality dictate that intergroup prejudices are unacceptable, and consequently the 
experience of prejudice is unpleasant. The psychological discomfort aroused by the activation of 
negative affect associated with a social group can be reduced by the perceiver constructing an 
acceptable justification for the prejudice. Threat can emerge as justification for prejudice not 
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simply because of the general motive to maintain cognitive consistency, but because of the more 
specific goal of maintaining a self-image that is consistent with egalitarian ideals. To the extent 
that the implications of threat for affect and behavior are comparatively unambiguous (relative to 
competence, for example), threat perception can be an especially effective tool in maintaining 
the desired unprejudiced self-image. 
I have emphasized the justification function of threat, although the relationship between 
prejudice and threat identified by the current research also fits within a broader set of 
psychological theories of threat. Realistic group conflict theory (RGCT; Sherif, 1966) 
conceptualizes prejudice as a justification of intergroup competition; the theory asserts that when 
groups compete for scarce resources, outgroup derogation serves to justify the goal of ingroup 
gain at the outgroup’s expense. Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) maintains 
that individuals derive a sense of positive social identity (i.e., self-esteem) from their affiliation 
with the ingroup; outgroup derogation results when the positive value of the ingroup is somehow 
called into question (see Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999 for a discussion of 
different types of social identity threat). RGCT and SIT suggest that intergroup competition and 
social identity threat cause prejudice. A threat as justification perspective instead suggests that 
prejudice can come before and motivate perceived competition or perceived social identity 
threats as means of rationalizing felt negative affect.  
Aversive racism theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) makes a very similar argument to the 
JSM in suggesting that people experience conflict between felt but unacknowledged prejudice 
and egalitarian values. When no justification for prejudice is available, aversive racists are 
motivated by their egalitarian values to suppress the unwanted negative affect and show no racial 
bias. When an external justification can be made, however, aversive racists will allow the 
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negative affect to bias their judgments and behavior. Aversive racism theory assumes that a 
mental representation of negative affect is preexisting, and therefore affect temporally precedes 
cognition in the model. The theory’s predictions hinge on the availability of an external 
justification for prejudice, so that cognitive factors serve as releasers of prejudice. The current 
work demonstrates that threat perception is one such type of justification. Thus aversive racism 
theory is consistent with the idea that threat perception can be a justification for prejudice.  
Theoretical Implications 
 The current research found support for the hypothesized model in which affective 
reactions to social groups temporally precede and causally influence threat perception and 
behavioral responses. These findings undermine the favored interpretation of the correlational 
basis of ITT, SDT, IET and the sociofunctional approach to prejudice. Each of these theories 
suggests that threat perception causes prejudice, though the theories differ in the extent to which 
specific causal predictions are made and in the empirical evidence available to support such 
causal claims. 
ITT predicts that threat—including realistic threat, symbolic threat, negative stereotypes 
and intergroup anxiety—causes prejudice. The current research demonstrated just the opposite—
prejudice causes heightened perception of threat; the finding was replicated across measures of 
realistic threat (Expt. 4), symbolic threat (Expt. 4), social distance (Expt. 2), and negative 
stereotypes in the dimensions of warmth-relevant and threat-relevant traits (Expt. 1-3). And 
while there is experimental evidence to support the ITT-preferred model that threat causes 
prejudice (Stephan et al., 2005), the current experiments provide new evidence for the reverse 
causal model. Therefore, an important theoretical contribution of the current research is that any 
correlational evidence cited in support of ITT (Stephan et al., 1999; Stephan et al., 1998) is 
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consistent with both directional paths—threat can cause prejudice, and prejudice can cause 
perception of threat—and thus do not uniquely support ITT. 
SDT makes the similar but more specific prediction that threat to social hierarchy causes 
prejudice. Experimental evidence supports the theory’s basic causal assumption (Esses, Jackson, 
& Armstrong, 1998; Nierman & Crandall, 2008, February; Pratto & Shih, 2000), though to my 
knowledge the reverse causal model has not been experimentally tested. The current research 
demonstrates that prejudice can cause perception of threat, although a more precise reversal of 
SDT would test the hypothesis that mere prejudice can cause perception of threat that is specific 
to a group’s status in the social hierarchy. This remains an important direction for future 
research. 
The sociofunctional approach to prejudice predicts that specific threats cause functionally 
specific emotional reactions, which in turn affect behavioral responses. The current research 
found that prejudiced affect causes stereotypes and perceptions of threat to emerge, which in turn 
can direct behavioral responses. Conditioned prejudice caused increased avoidance and 
decreased approach behaviors, and these effects were mediated by emergent stereotypes in the 
dimensions of warmth and threat, respectively (Expt. 3). Additionally, specific emotions were 
linked to differential behavioral responses through specific types of threat perception. The effect 
of disgust on avoidance-approach behavior was carried by realistic threat perception, whereas the 
effect of disgust on aggression was carried by symbolic threat perception (Expt. 4). The existing 
evidence in support of the sociofunctional approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg & 
Cottrell, 2002) is correlational and thus does not uniquely support the theory’s causal assumption 
that specific threats cause functionally specific emotional reactions. The current research 
supports the hypothesized model in which affective reactions causally influence threat 
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perception. By contrast, the causal direction suggested by the sociofunctional approach was not 
supported by the data. It should be noted, however, that the experimental method employed was 
not designed to provide the best test of this alternative hypothesis. 
IET predicts that appraisals of potential harm to the ingroup cause specific intergroup 
emotions, which in turn affect behavioral responses. Thus IET makes very similar causal 
predictions to the sociofunctional approach, although IET emphasizes that both threat appraisal 
and emotional reactions reflect group-level concerns rather than personal concerns. The causal 
model suggested by IET has received experimental support (e.g., Mackie et al., 2000). The 
current research provides initial evidence in support of the reverse causal model, demonstrating 
that affective reactions can precede perception of threat, and that threat can in turn influence 
behavioral responses. However, a better test of the reversal of IET would ensure that all 
constructs are assessed at the group level. The current research did assess realistic and symbolic 
threat at the group level; participants rated the threat that they perceived Eritrean and 
Mauritanian immigrants to pose to American jobs and American values. Differential emotions 
and behavioral response tendencies, however, were assessed at the individual level. Participants 
reported their individual emotional reactions to the groups and their personal anticipated 
behavioral responses. Future research should manipulate intergroup emotions and measure 
perceived threat to the ingroup and behaviors enacted on behalf of the ingroup in order to more 
precisely test the causal assumptions of IET. 
Bidirectionality of Prejudice and Threat 
Recognizing both directional paths in the relationship between prejudice and threat can 
advance theory by helping to clarify when prejudice forms in relation to threat perception. There 
are at least two fundamental human motives paramount for understanding the relationship 
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between prejudice and threat—self- or group-preservation and epistemology (i.e., the desire for a 
coherent understanding of the social world). Each of these basic needs can be satisfied by the co-
occurrence of prejudice and threat perception. First, accurate threat perception forms a rational 
basis for having negative feelings about a group; that threat causes prejudice is an adaptive 
response that helps people escape potential harm. Second, threat perception that emerges after 
the activation of prejudice provides an explanation for the negative affect; threat perception—
irrespective of its basis in fact—can be constructed as a means of understanding the social world. 
The current research found that mere prejudice temporally preceded and causally 
influenced threat perception in a controlled experimental context involving unfamiliar groups. 
The reverse causal model suggested by ITT and other theories of prejudice (threat causes 
prejudice) was not supported by this research, although the experimental method was not 
optimally designed to test this alternate hypothesis. Whether prejudice (the activation of negative 
affect) necessarily precedes threat perception cannot be determined based on the current data. 
Studies that show causal influence from threat to prejudice have typically used known social 
groups (e.g., Stephan et al., 2005), which makes it difficult to rule out the possibility that affect 
associated with those groups was activated prior to (or simultaneously with) the manipulation of 
threat. Future studies should manipulate threat posed by unfamiliar social groups and measure 
the affective reactions that result in order to compare the two causal pathways using the same 
experimental context. 
Outside the experimental context, affective and cognitive components of prejudice are 
difficult to separate. The mental representation of affect associated with existing social groups is 
stored in memory alongside cognitive knowledge structures (Stephan & Stephan, 1993); the 
activation of affective nodes can activate associated cognitive nodes, or vice versa. This suggests 
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that causal pathways among the affective and cognitive processes involved in prejudice may 
work in both directions. Rather than searching for simple cause and effect relationships among 
variables, a bidirectional view considers affective and cognitive processes involved in prejudice 
to be part of a complex, interdependent system. Intergroup threat can be both a cause and a 
consequence of prejudice. Perhaps what is most important about the relationship between 
prejudice and threat perception is that they must be in concordance.  
Reversing the direction of causality in a theory does not diminish its usefulness. It does, 
however, highlight the flexibility of interactive mental processes in resolving psychological 
tension and promoting balance. Bidirectionality among mental processes is at the heart of the 
cognitive consistency theories (Abelson, Aronson, McGuire, & Newcomb, 1968; Heider, 1958). 
Consistency theories focus on the motive to achieve a coherent understanding of the social 
world. Crandall, Silvia, N’Gbala, Tsang, and Dawson (2007) apply a Heidarian analysis to 
evaluate two conflicting perspectives on the relationship between political ideology and racial 
prejudice. Principled racism (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986) suggests that ideological beliefs such 
as prioritizing individual responsibility can lead one to endorse policy attitudes that others might 
label as racist (e.g., negative attitudes toward affirmative action, welfare support), implying that 
ideology causes racism. By contrast, symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981) suggests that 
political ideology develops as a socially acceptable means of expressing otherwise unacceptable 
racial prejudice, implying that racism causes ideology. Crandall et al. argue that anti-
government-interference policy preference and racial prejudice often coexist in the service of 
maintaining affective and cognitive consistency. Both causal directions are equally compelling 
explanations; “either one can lead to the other” (Crandall et al., 2007, p. 21). 
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The present research extends this view to prejudice and perception of threat. When a 
person perceives that the interests of her ingroup are threatened by another group, affective and 
cognitive consistency is maintained by subsequently disliking that group. Likewise, when a 
person recognizes she has negative feelings toward a group, affective and cognitive consistency 
is maintained by subsequently perceiving the group as threatening. Disliking a group, coupled 
with perceiving its members as threatening, allows one to construct a coherent story about how 
and why the group is “bad” that satisfies one’s epistemic needs. Both causal pathways are 
equally good routes to maintaining balance, and both pathways should be incorporated into 
theoretical models and empirically tested. 
Implications for Reducing Prejudice and Intergroup Conflict 
The primary contribution of this research is in demonstrating that prejudice causes 
perception of threat; where negative affect exists, a perception of threat is likely to follow. This 
finding is important because basic assumptions implicit in contemporary models of prejudice—
such as the view that cognitive antecedents of prejudice are the core problem to be solved—may 
be hindering the field’s progress in improving intergroup relations. Understanding how and, 
more precisely, when perceptions of group threat emerge speaks directly to the goal of improving 
intergroup relations by using empirically sound research findings to inform strategies for 
prejudice reduction and conflict resolution. 
Cognitively-oriented theories of prejudice such as ITT, SDT, ITT, and the 
sociofunctional approach imply—by identifying threat appraisal as a primary causal factor—that 
targeting individual beliefs and stereotypes will reduce prejudice. My research suggests that this 
strategy is unlikely to be effective for long-term change as it demonstrates how easy it is for new 
stereotypes and perceptions of threat to emerge following the activation of negative affect. 
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Instead, my research suggests that targeting feelings by associating groups with positive affect 
may be a better strategy of prejudice reduction. One possible strategy is to create positive media 
representations, perhaps by increasing the visibility of minority group members in positively 
valued social roles and occupations, or by featuring more positive interpersonal interactions 
between majority and minority group characters on popular televisions shows and in movies. 
Since threat is a major barrier to effective intergroup communication and cooperation, 
understanding where threat can come from is critical knowledge that can assist advocates and 
policy makers in reducing intergroup conflict. The Contact Hypothesis (Allport, 1954) offers one 
of the most promising strategies for reducing intergroup conflict. Many empirical studies have 
demonstrated successful results, showing that when contact is pleasant, cooperative, and 
sanctioned by authorities it leads to more positive evaluations (for a review, see Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2000). Yet in some cases, intergroup contact may actually increase prejudice (Dijker, 
1987; Fiske & Ruscher, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1989). Since social interaction is inevitably 
shaped by the feelings aroused during an encounter, intergroup contact may more effectively 
reduce conflict through affective factors rather than through cognitive factors. If so, then 
interventions that encourage positive intergroup contact should focus primarily on affective 
reactions. One way to do this is by associating groups with positive images and encouraging 
feelings of empathy, which should diminish perceptions of threat and encourage effective 
intergroup communication. Public policy campaigns should target emotional reactions by 
featuring images of cute, innocent children or by associating the targeted social groups with 
positive, upbeat music, delicious smells, or picturesque landscapes. Other strategies such as 
exercise or humor might be effectively used to diffuse the negative emotions that are often 
activated in intergroup contexts.  
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Conclusions 
Prejudice and threat are fundamental components of social interaction in intergroup 
contexts. The experience of prejudice is a relatively fast and automatic response that reflects the 
association of a social group with negative affect; by comparison, perception of threat and 
stereotyping are more controlled processes that require cognitive resources and attention. The 
major contribution of this work is in highlighting that affective reactions can come first in 
intergroup situations. The finding that threat perception can emerge in the absence of content-
based information about a social group suggests that people are not rational, objective perceivers 
who evaluate the social world primarily through facts and information. Instead, people’s 
evaluations of other social groups are greatly influenced by the feelings that are experienced in 
intergroup contexts. This knowledge should be used to advance theoretical understanding of how 
and when prejudice forms in relation to threat perception, as well as to inform prejudice 
reduction techniques. 
That threat perception serves as justification for prejudice is one reason why prejudice 
often goes unnoticed—an acceptably justified prejudice may not be recognized as a prejudice at 
all. Therefore, in order for researchers to develop more effective means of prejudice reduction 
we must first advance our understanding of how prejudice is connected to the rest of the 
cognitive network. An affective primacy perspective suggests that in intergroup situations, 
people may know how they feel about a group before they understand why. Consequently, theory 
and research on prejudice should focus on how affective reactions in intergroup situations relate 
to cognitive justifications which serve as releasers of prejudice such as ideological beliefs, 
stereotypes, and perceptions of threat.    
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Footnotes 
1. Experiment 1 in the current paper is the same data reported as Experiment 2 in 
Crandall, Bahns, Warner, and Schaller (2011). The data from Experiment 3 in the current paper 
contribute to the sample reported as Experiment 3 in Crandall et al. 
2. A funneled debriefing interview assessed participants’ awareness of the contingencies 
between target countries and affective stimuli. Ten participants expressed some awareness of the 
contingencies, however awareness did not interact with the manipulation of affect or the 
stereotype measures and so these cases were not excluded from the analysis. 
3. Descriptive statistics reported in the text indicate sums of traits ascribed to each of the 
groups, whereas the figures show proportions. 
4. Estimates for the pathways from the IV to the mediators differ for the three behavioral 
responses because each of the models was estimated with a different set of covariates. For 
example, the model for approach behaviors directed toward Azerbaijanis was estimated with 
approach behaviors directed toward Mauritanians as a covariate, while the model for avoidance 
of Azerbaijanis was estimated with avoidance of Mauritanians as a covariate. 
5. The estimation of indirect effects does not require that the total effect of X on Y be 
significant (Hayes, 2009, pp. 415-418). If two or more indirect paths carry the effect of X on Y 
and those paths operate in opposite directions, then the opposite signs cancel each other out and 
the total effect is not statistically different from zero. In the present example, the indirect effect 
of the manipulation on avoidance through warmth is positive and the indirect effect of the 
manipulation on avoidance through competence and threat is negative, thus producing a total 
effect of the manipulation on avoidance that is not significant. 
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6. There were three other statistically significant but conceptually uninteresting effects: a 
main effect for Country Rated such that stereotype endorsement was greater for Mauritania 
compared to Eritrea, a main effect for Stereotype Content Dimension such that warmth and 
competence were endorsed more than threat, and an interaction of Country Rated and Stereotype 
Content Dimension such that stereotype endorsement was greater for Mauritania on the 
dimensions of warmth and competence whereas stereotype endorsement was greater for Eritrea 
on the dimension of threat. 
7. Models for disgust were estimated with data from the full sample, including 
participants in the failed fear manipulation conditions. Models testing the effects of fear on threat 
perception and behavioral responses are reported in Appendix F. 
8. The indirect effect of disgust on aggression through symbolic threat is positive and the 
indirect effect of disgust on aggression through realistic threat is negative, thus producing a total 
effect of disgust on aggression that is not significant. 
9. The pattern of results did not change when disgust and fear were both estimated as 
potential mediators of the effect of threat perception on behavioral response tendencies. The 
indirect effects of fear were not significant for the effects of realistic and symbolic threat on 
avoidance-approach and aggressive behaviors.
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Table 1 
Pre-test Ratings of Countries 
 
Country Affect Familiarity 
 M SD M SD 
Eritrea 55.19 21.01 1.62 .90 
Mauritania 53.57 19.85 1.43 .69 
Azerbaijan 55.17 19.39 1.82 .72 
Poland 72.00 20.24 2.88 .34 
Vietnam 64.00 22.22 2.97 .18 
Egypt 76.33 19.56 3.00 .00 
Niger 62.67 19.11 2.77 .50 
Latvia 62.00 19.37 2.07 .86 
Singapore 73.67 18.47 2.63 .55 
Oman 55.00 21.69 1.81 .83 
Tajikistan 50.00 20.38 1.72 .84 
Yoralia [made-up] 49.26 21.65 1.09 .28 
 
Note. Higher numbers reflect more positive affect (0 = very negative, 100 = very positive) and 
greater familiarity (1 = I’ve never heard of it, 2 = I’ve heard of it but don’t know where it is, 3 = 
I’ve heard of it and know where it is). 
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Table 2 
Behavioral Response Tendency Means by Condition and Correlations, Experiment 3  
 Negative Affect Positive Affect Correlations 
 M SD M SD 1. 2. 3. 
1. Approach 4.16 1.23 4.56 1.06 -- -.45 -.13 
2. Avoid 2.92 1.60 2.84 1.36 -.40 -- -.38 
3. Aggress 2.84 1.19 2.58 1.04 -.08 -.39 -- 
 
Note. Numbers below the diagonal represent correlations among the behavioral response 
tendencies for the country paired with negative affect, collapsing across the counterbalancing 
factor of Country Paired with Negative Stimuli; numbers above the diagonal represent 
correlations for the country paired with positive affect. All coefficients were significant at 
p<.001, except between 1 and 3.
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Table 3 
Stereotype Means by Condition and Correlations, Experiment 3 
 Negative Affect Positive Affect Correlations 
 M SD M SD 1. 2. 3. 
1. Warmth 4.36 1.00 4.60 1.06 -- -.77 -.83 
2. Competence 4.56 0.94 4.78 0.96 -.74 -- -.69 
3. Threat 3.73 1.01 3.48 1.01 -.84 -.66 -- 
 
Note. Numbers below the diagonal represent correlations among the stereotype content 
dimensions for the country paired with negative affect, collapsing across the counterbalancing 
factor of Country Paired with Negative Stimuli; numbers above the diagonal represent 
correlations for the country paired with positive affect. All coefficients were significant at 
p<.001.
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Table 4 
Bootstrapping Results for Reverse Causal Models, Experiment 3 
 
IV Mediator DV a path b path c path c’ path Lower 
CI 
Upper 
CI 
Significant 
Indirect 
Effect? 
Warmth Affect Approach ***9.75*** .01 ***.77*** ***.71*** -.04 .30 No 
Competence Affect Approach ***7.93*** .01 **.44** *.32* -.08 .37 No 
Threat Affect Approach ***-9.71***- .00 ***-.70***- ***-.67***- -.19 .08 No 
Warmth Affect Avoid ***10.05*** .01 ***-.88***- ***-1.00***- .00 .38 No 
Competence Affect Avoid **7.45** .00 **-.49**- **-.51**- -.08 .22 No 
Threat Affect Avoid ***-9.96***- .01 ***.54*** ***.64*** -.29 .05 No 
Warmth Affect Aggress ***10.34*** .01 *-.23*- **-.31**- -.01 .29 No 
Competence Affect Aggress **8.48** .00 -.16- -.19- -.03 .16 No 
Threat Affect Aggress ***-10.07***- .01 *.19* *.27* -.20 .03 No 
  
Note. Models were estimated with 1000 bootstrap samples. Significant tests for the indirect 
effect of affect were estimated using the 95% confidence interval. Parameter estimates are 
reported for the path from the IV to the mediator (a path), from the mediator to the DV 
controlling for the IV (b path), the total effect of the IV on the DV (c path), and the direct effect 
of the IV on the DV (c’ path). 
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Table 5 
Perceived Threat Means by Condition and Correlations, Experiment 4  
 Negative Affect Positive Affect Correlations 
 M SD M SD 1. 2.  
Realistic Threat 3.08 1.46 2.67 1.34 -- .87  
Symbolic Threat 3.08 1.31 2.64 1.27 .83 --  
 
Note. Numbers below the diagonal represent correlations among the threat perceptions for the 
country paired with negative affect, collapsing across the counterbalancing factor of Country 
Paired with Negative Stimuli; numbers above the diagonal represent correlations for the country 
paired with positive affect. All coefficients were significant at p<.001. 
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Table 6 
Behavioral Response Tendency Means by Condition and Correlations, Experiment 4  
 Disgust Positive Affect Correlations 
 M SD M SD 1. 2. 3. 
1. Approach 4.69 1.13 4.91 1.10 -- -.35 -.05 
2. Avoid 2.73 1.19 2.61 1.31 -.41 -- -.53 
3. Aggress 2.25 1.18 2.08 1.10 -.35 .47 -- 
 
Note. Numbers below the diagonal represent correlations among the behavioral response 
tendencies for the country paired with negative affect, collapsing across the counterbalancing 
factor of Country Paired with Negative Stimuli; numbers above the diagonal represent 
correlations for the country paired with positive affect. All coefficients were significant at p<.05, 
except between 1 and 3 above the diagonal. 
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Figure 1. A conditioning procedure that creates novel prejudices (affective associations) results 
in the formation of new stereotypes along the Warmth dimension but not the Competence 
dimension, Experiment 1.
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Figure 2. A conditioning procedure that creates novel prejudices (affective associations) results 
in increased aggressive response tendencies and decreased approach-oriented response 
tendencies, Experiment 3. 
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Figure 3. A conditioning procedure that creates novel prejudices (affective associations) results 
in the formation of new stereotypes along the Threat dimension and along the Warmth dimension 
but not the Competence dimension, Experiment 3.
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Figure 4a. The conditioning manipulation’s effect on approach-oriented response tendencies is 
mediated by threat-relevant stereotypes, Experiment 3. 
 
Figure 4b. The conditioning manipulation’s effect on avoidance-oriented response tendencies is 
mediated by warmth stereotypes, Experiment 3. 
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Figure 4c. The conditioning manipulation’s effect on aggressive response tendencies is not 
mediated by stereotype endorsement, Experiment 3. 
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Figure 5. The reverse causal models suggested by IET and the sociofunctional approach, in 
which affect mediates the relationship between stereotypes and behaviors, Experiment 3. 
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Figure 6. A conditioning procedure that creates affective associations specific to disgust results 
in heightened perception of realistic and symbolic threat, Experiment 4. 
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Figure 7. A conditioning procedure that creates affective associations specific to disgust results 
in increased aggressive response tendencies, Experiment 4. 
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Figure 8a. Disgust indirectly increases avoidance-approach response tendencies through 
heightened perception of realistic threat, Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 8b. Disgust indirectly increases aggressive response tendencies through heightened 
perception of symbolic threat, Experiment 4. 
96 
  
Figure 9a. The reverse causal model suggested by IET and the sociofunctional approach, in 
which disgust mediates the relationship between realistic threat and avoidance-approach 
behavior, Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 9b. The reverse causal model suggested by IET and the sociofunctional approach, in 
which disgust mediates the relationship between symbolic threat and aggressive behavior, 
Experiment 4. 
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Appendix A 
Images Used in the Conditioning Procedure 
Images for Experiments 1-3 from the International Affective Picture System database 
Negative Affect Valence Positive Affect Valence 
6260 gun 2.44 (1.54) 1440 baby seal 8.19 (1.53) 
7359 pie with cockroaches 2.92 (1.70) 1441 mother and baby polar bears 7.97 (1.28) 
7380 pizza with cockroaches 2.46 (1.42) 1463 kittens 7.45 (1.76) 
9180 injured seals 2.99 (1.61) 1710 puppies 8.34 (1.12) 
9280 smoke stacks 2.80 (1.54) 1750 bunnies 8.28 (1.07) 
9301 toilet with feces 2.26 (1.56) 1811 laughing monkeys 7.62 (1.59) 
9342 polluted river 2.85 (1.41) 1920 seals playing with ball 7.90 (1.48) 
9560 duck covered in tar 2.12 (1.93) 5700 mountains 7.61 (1.46) 
9561 injured kitty 2.68 (1.92) 5982 white clouds 7.61 (1.48) 
9830 cigarette butts 2.54 (1.75) 7330 hot fudge sundae 7.69 (1.84) 
  
Note. Valence ratings reported by Lang, Bradley and Cuthbart (2005) (1 = low pleasure, 9 = high 
pleasure). Tabled values are means; standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
Images for Experiment 4 from the International Affective Picture System database 
Fear Manipulation Disgust Fear Anger Happiness Interest Sadness General 
Affect 
1050 snake 2.83 (1.52) 3.42 (1.25) 2.64 (1.51) 1.50 (0.88) 2.28 (1.21) 2.00 (1.29) 2.22 (0.96) 
1114 snake 2.68 (1.28) 3.45 (1.29) 2.18 (1.14) 1.71 (1.01) 2.08 (1.19) 1.97 (1.05) 2.34 (1.05) 
1120 snake 2.89 (1.39) 3.58 (1.36) 2.58 (1.42) 1.39 (0.73) 2.28 (1.14) 2.11 (1.28) 2.06 (0.79) 
1300 dog baring teeth 2.89 (1.33) 3.24 (1.50) 2.71 (1.39) 1.39 (0.79) 1.95 (1.06) 2.13 (1.19) 1.92 (0.88) 
1525 dog baring teeth 2.31 (1.28) 3.61 (1.27) 2.53 (1.23) 1.28 (0.57) 2.11 (1.06) 2.11 (1.21) 2.00 (0.93) 
1726 tiger baring teeth 1.58 (0.87) 3.14 (1.53) 1.50 (0.77) 1.92 (1.05) 2.53 (1.38) 1.64 (1.02) 2.78 (0.87) 
1931 shark 1.87 (1.07) 3.05 (1.39) 1.79 (1.09) 2.00 (1.07) 2.24 (1.36) 1.71 (1.09) 2.76 (1.02) 
1932 shark baring teeth 2.94 (1.39) 3.67 (1.41) 2.81 (1.41) 1.58 (0.84) 2.56 (1.32) 2.39 (1.42) 2.17 (1.08) 
5973 tornado 2.22 (1.12) 3.56 (1.27) 2.42 (1.25) 1.47 (0.77) 1.47 (0.77) 2.14 (1.25) 2.31 (1.01) 
9630 atom bomb 2.50 (1.39) 3.11 (1.47) 2.68 (1.38) 1.50 (0.83) 1.50 (0.83) 2.45 (1.46) 2.08 (1.02) 
 
Disgust Manipulation Disgust Fear Anger Happiness Interest Sadness General 
Affect 
1220 spider 3.61 (1.42) 3.00 (1.41) 2.71 (1.25) 1.39 (0.64) 2.05 (1.35) 2.03 (1.38) 2.11 (1.06) 
1270 beetle 3.33 (1.37) 2.11 (1.19) 2.78 (1.46) 1.31 (0.62) 1.75 (0.91) 1.78 (0.99) 2.14 (1.05) 
1274 cockroaches 3.71 (1.33) 2.29 (1.43) 2.76 (1.42) 1.24 (0.49) 1.39 (0.82) 2.08 (1.28) 1.89 (0.98) 
1275 cockroaches 3.08 (1.34) 2.37 (1.38) 2.39 (1.37) 1.37 (0.63) 1.58 (0.92) 1.87 (1.17) 1.95 (0.80) 
1280 rat 3.92 (1.18) 2.64 (1.44) 2.89 (1.39) 1.19 (0.47) 1.69 (0.86) 2.11 (1.30) 1.64 (0.72) 
3068 severe burn victim 4.89 (0.32) 4.11 (1.14) 4.19 (1.31) 1.08 (0.50) 2.83 (1.54) 3.17 (1.63) 1.11 (0.40) 
3250 open heart surgery 3.92 (1.36) 2.16 (1.31) 2.61 (1.28) 1.26 (0.50) 2.21 (1.36) 1.97 (1.20) 1.97 (1.03) 
7360 pie with cockroaches 3.61 (1.38) 1.94 (1.12) 2.83 (1.44) 1.44 (0.94) 1.78 (0.99) 2.08 (1.30) 1.97 (0.97) 
9008 feces 4.28 (1.06) 1.92 (1.25) 2.92 (1.48) 1.33 (0.99) 1.78 (1.12) 2.03 (1.18) 1.67 (0.99) 
9373 smashed food 3.32 (1.42) 2.08 (1.15) 2.84 (1.35) 1.26 (0.50) 2.05 (1.23) 2.11 (1.20) 1.84 (0.72) 
 
Note. Values are means from pre-testing (N=74); standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Emotions were measured with items from the differential emotions scale (Izard et al., 1993; see 
Appendix D) on a scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = very much so. General affect was rated from 0 
= very negative to 100 = very positive. 
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Appendix B 
Words Used in the Conditioning Procedure 
Words for Experiments 1-3 
Experiments 1-2 Experiment 3 
Negative Affect Valence Positive Affect Valence Negative Affect Valence Positive Affect Valence 
danger 2.56 (1.37) babies 5.06 (1.71) abuse 1.80 (1.23) acceptance 7.98 (1.42) 
death 1.75 (1.27) happiness 5.79 (1.24) bomb 2.10 (1.19) baby 8.22 (1.20) 
fear 2.22 (1.31) hug 6.09 (0.91) cancer 1.50 (0.85) cake 7.26 (1.27) 
frown 2.31 (0.86) kittens 5.24 (1.48) death 1.61 (1.40) delight 8.26 (1.04) 
grave 2.16 (1.05) love 6.73 (0.67) failure 1.70 (1.07) ecstasy 7.98 (1.52) 
pain 1.94 (0.95) party 5.73 (1.23) gloom 1.88 (1.23) fame 7.93 (1.29) 
pollution 1.91 (0.96) puppies 5.79 (1.32) hatred 1.98 (1.92) gift 7.77 (2.24) 
sick 1.94 (0.91) rainbow 5.48 (0.94) infection 1.66 (1.34) handsome 7.93 (1.47) 
stench 2.06 (0.84) smile 5.76 (0.97) jail 1.95 (1.27) joy 8.60 (0.71) 
violence 1.87 (1.10) sunshine 6.09 (0.88) killer 1.89 (1.39) kiss 8.26 (1.54) 
  
Words for Experiment 4 
Disgust Manipulation Disgust Fear Anger Happiness Interest Sadness 
diseased 3.60 (1.26) 2.65 (1.50) 2.31 (1.23) 1.27 (0.72) 2.12 (1.18) 2.54 (1.33) 
disgusted 3.77 (1.39) 1.65 (1.13) 2.69 (1.26) 1.23 (0.71) 1.73 (1.04) 2.12 (1.17) 
filthy 3.65 (1.26) 1.92 (1.20) 2.38 (1.42) 1.27 (0.72) 1.65 (0.94) 2.15 (1.26) 
foul 3.46 (1.30) 1.80 (1.22) 2.23 (1.27) 1.27 (0.60) 1.85 (1.32) 2.04 (1.22) 
gross 3.73 (1.19) 2.17 (1.11) 2.33 (1.44) 1.33 (0.78) 1.83 (1.27) 2.08 (1.08) 
infected 3.62 (1.30) 2.62 (1.36) 2.27 (1.34) 1.35 (0.80) 2.08 (1.44) 2.38 (1.27) 
putrid 3.27 (1.46) 1.58 (0.86) 2.15 (1.19) 1.50 (1.03) 1.77 (1.07) 1.85 (1.01) 
raunchy 3.46 (1.53) 1.73 (1.19) 2.27 (1.25) 1.81 (1.20) 2.00 (1.26) 1.69 (1.26) 
rotten 3.92 (1.00) 1.75 (1.06) 2.58 (1.16) 1.17 (0.58) 1.42 (0.79) 1.92 (1.16) 
vomit 4.04 (1.28) 1.96 (1.28) 2.35 (1.32) 1.60 (1.41) 1.69 (1.32) 2.23 (1.39) 
  
Fear Manipulation Disgust Fear Anger Happiness Interest Sadness 
attacker 2.24 (1.42) 3.32 (1.68) 2.96 (1.46) 1.35 (0.85) 2.50 (1.36) 2.65 (1.41) 
bomb 2.67 (1.23) 3.58 (1.24) 2.92 (1.24) 1.67 (1.37) 2.33 (1.37) 3.00 (1.21) 
earthquake 2.12 (1.34) 3.54 (1.45) 2.23 (1.39) 1.46 (1.10) 2.69 (1.26) 3.00 (1.26) 
explosion 2.27 (1.51) 3.35 (1.44) 2.62 (1.58) 1.69 (1.32) 2.85 (1.54) 2.50 (1.45) 
fear 1.83 (0.94) 3.42 (1.38) 2.00 (0.95) 1.25 (0.62) 2.50 (1.38) 2.92 (0.90) 
gunman 2.73 (1.64) 3.58 (1.53) 3.00 (1.55) 1.44 (1.04) 2.46 (1.39) 2.77 (1.58) 
horror 2.46 (1.50) 3.46 (1.48) 2.19 (1.39) 1.65 (1.32) 2.54 (1.45) 2.50 (1.45) 
scared 1.67 (0.89) 4.08 (0.79) 1.67 (0.78) 1.08 (0.29) 1.33 (0.65) 2.83 (1.03) 
terror 2.27 (1.31) 3.62 (1.47) 2.50 (1.42) 1.42 (0.99) 2.23 (1.31) 2.69 (1.32) 
victim 2.62 (1.53) 3.19 (1.50) 3.12 (1.53) 1.44 (1.23) 2.42 (1.50) 2.81 (1.50) 
  
Note. Tabled values are means; standard deviations are in parentheses. Valence ratings for Expts. 
1-2 are from pre-testing (N = 35) (1 = extremely negative, 7 = extremely positive); valence 
ratings for Expt. 3 as reported by Bradley and Lang (1999) (1 = low pleasure, 9 = high pleasure).  
Emotion ratings for Expt. 4 are from pretesting (N = 42). Emotions were measured with items 
from the differential emotions scale (Izard et al., 1993; see Appendix D) on a scale from 1 = not 
at all to 5 = very much so. 
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Appendix C 
Neutral Filler Images and Words Used in the Conditioning Procedure 
Experiments 1-4 Experiments 1-2 Experiments 3-4 
Filler Image Valence Filler Word Valence Filler Word Valence 
1935 hermit crab 4.88 (1.44) barn 4.19 (1.04) butter 5.33 (1.20) 
5510 mushroom 5.15 (1.43) bird 3.94 (1.19) column 5.17 (0.85) 
5531 mushroom 5.15 (1.45) blue 4.64 (1.44) context 5.20 (1.38) 
5532 mushrooms 5.19 (1.69) boat 4.21 (0.95) cord 5.10 (1.09) 
5534 mushrooms 5.31 (1.17) book 4.39 (0.99) cork 5.22 (1.13) 
5535 still life 4.81 (1.52) bridge 3.94 (0.72) cow 5.57 (1.53) 
5740 plant 5.21 (1.38) camera 4.25 (1.13) detail 5.55 (1.58) 
6150 outlet 5.08 (1.17) car 4.14 (1.20) door 5.13 (1.44) 
7000 rolling pin 5.00 (0.84) chair 3.97 (0.56) egg 5.29 (1.82) 
7002 towel 4.97 (0.97) chicken 4.46 (1.12) elbow 5.12 (0.92) 
7020 fan 4.97 (1.04) grass 4.66 (0.11) elevator 5.44 (1.18) 
7035 mug 4.98 (0.96) green 4.64 (1.25) engine 5.20 (1.18) 
7036 shipyard 4.88 (1.08) hay 3.75 (0.91) fabric 5.30 (1.20) 
7037 trains 4.81 (1.12) horse 4.25 (1.27) farm 5.53 (1.85) 
7038 shoes 4.82 (1.20) house 4.28 (0.85) finger 5.29 (1.42) 
7041 baskets 4.99 (1.12) lamp 4.11 (0.71) foot 5.02 (0.93) 
7043 drill 5.17 (1.26) marker 4.03 (0.74) fork 5.29 (0.97) 
7050 hair dryer 4.93 (0.81) oil 3.50 (1.63) glacier 5.50 (1.25) 
7055 light bulb 4.90 (0.64) oil 3.50 (1.63) golfer 5.61 (1.93) 
7056 tool 5.07 (1.02) orange 4.50 (1.21) hairpin 5.26 (1.45) 
7059 key ring 4.93 (0.81) paint 3.80 (1.11) hat 5.46 (1.36) 
7090 book 5.19 (1.46) pen  3.94 (0.83) hay 5.24 (1.24) 
7160 fabric 5.02 (1.10) pencil 3.97 (0.51) headlight 5.24 (1.51) 
7161 pole 4.98 (1.02) plane 4.25 (1.27) history 5.24 (2.01) 
7170 light bulb 5.14 (1.28) purple 4.42 (1.54) industry 5.30 (1.61) 
7175 lamp 4.87 (1.00) red 4.39 (1.36) jelly 5.66 (1.44) 
7179 rug 5.06 (1.05) right 4.31 (0.96) journal 5.14 (1.49) 
7182 checker board 5.16 (1.31) straw 3.97 (0.91) kerchief 5.11 (1.33) 
7184 abstract art 4.84 (1.02) street 3.97 (0.91) ketchup 5.60 (1.35) 
7185 abstract art 4.97 (0.87) umbrella 3.83 (0.81) kettle 5.22 (0.91) 
7187 abstract art 5.07 (1.02) wheel 4.08 (0.97) lantern 5.57 (1.19) 
7211 clock 4.81 (1.78) Avarica 4.03 (1.08) lawn 5.24 (0.86) 
7217 clothes rack 4.82 (0.99) Avernos 3.84 (1.24) market 5.66 (1.02) 
7233 plate 5.09 (1.46) Dunwich 3.81 (1.30) method 5.56 (1.76) 
7235 chair 4.96 (1.18) Gargona 3.71 (1.01) museum 5.54 (1.86) 
7247 abstract art 5.05 (1.00) Hojah 3.70 (1.06) name 5.55 (2.24) 
7491 building 4.82 (1.03) Mohesia 3.77 (1.02) news 5.30 (1.67) 
7547 bridge 5.21 (0.96) Penwich 3.97 (1.43) office 5.24 (1.59) 
7950 tissue 4.94 (1.21) Renardy 3.77 (1.06) paint 5.62 (1.72) 
  
 
Note. Tabled values are means; standard deviations are in parentheses. Valence ratings for filler 
images as reported in the International Affective Picture System Database by Lang, Bradley and 
Cuthbart (2005) (1 = low pleasure, 9 = high pleasure). Valence ratings for filler words used in 
Expts. 1-2 are from pre-testing (N = 35) (1 = extremely negative, 7 = extremely positive); valence 
ratings for filler words used in Expts. 3-4 as reported by Bradley and Lang (1999) (1 = low 
pleasure, 9 = high pleasure). 
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Appendix D 
Differential Emotions Scale 
1. Feel disgusted, like something is sickening. 
2. Feel angry, irritated, annoyed. 
3. Feel discouraged, like you can’t make it, nothing is going right. 
4. Feel so interested in what you’re doing, caught up in it. 
5. Feel fearful, like you’re in danger, very tense. 
6. Feel happy. 
Realistic Threat Scale 
1. Eritrean (Mauritanian) immigrants are taking jobs away from American citizens. 
2. Eritrean (Mauritanian) immigrants are making our neighborhoods less safe. 
3. Eritrean (Mauritanian) immigrants should be eligible for the same health-care benefits 
received by American citizens. [reversed] 
4. Eritrean (Mauritanian) immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans. 
Symbolic Threat Scale 
1. Immigration from Eritrea (Mauritania) is undermining traditional American culture. 
2. The values and beliefs of Eritrean (Mauritanian) immigrants are not compatible with the 
beliefs and values of most Americans. 
3. Eritrean (Mauritanian) immigration is contaminating America’s reputation as moral and good. 
4. Eritrean (Mauritanian) immigrants share the same moral values as most Americans. [reversed] 
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Appendix E 
Stereotype Results for Full Sample, Experiment 4 
 Disgust/Fear Positive Affect 
 M SD M SD 
Warmth 4.37 0.94 4.58 0.92 
Competence 4.54 0.80 4.62 0.78 
Threat 3.59 1.16 3.51 1.01 
 
Collapsing across Emotion Targeted, a 2 (Country Paired with Negative Stimuli: Eritrea 
or Mauritania) X 2 (Stereotype Content Dimension: Warmth, Competence) X 2 (Country Rated: 
Eritrea, Mauritania) mixed model ANOVA was conducted on stereotypes of warmth and 
competence. The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1, 93) = 1.69, p = .20, η =.13. 
When a country was paired with negative-affect stimuli (either disgust- or fear-provoking), its 
inhabitants were stereotyped as lower in warmth compared to the inhabitants of the country 
paired with the positive-affect stimuli, F(1, 93) = 3.90, p = .05; η = .20. The manipulation’s 
effect on competence was relatively smaller, F(1, 93) = 2.23, p = .14; η =.15. 
A separate 2 (Country Paired with Negative Stimuli) X 2 (Country Rated) repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on threat-relevant stereotype traits. The predicted interaction 
was not significant, F < 1. The manipulation of affect had no effect on endorsement of threat-
relevant traits. 
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Appendix F 
Mediational Analysis of Fear, Experiment 4 
 
Fear was positively associated with realistic (β = .46, p = .001) and symbolic threat (β = 
.40, p = .002). The more participants felt afraid, the more threat they perceived; the effect was 
somewhat stronger for realistic threat. Fear also had a significant effect on avoidance-approach 
behaviors (β = .72, p = .0003). This effect was reduced but not eliminated by controlling for 
realistic and symbolic threat, (β = .29, p = .06). The results with 1000 bootstrap samples 
indicated that the indirect effects of fear on avoidance-approach behavior through realistic and 
symbolic threat were not significant. The more participants experienced fear associated with a 
social group, the more they anticipated avoiding the group (and the less they anticipated 
approaching the group). The effect of fear on avoidance-approach behaviors was not mediated by 
perception of threat. 
The total effect of fear on aggressive responses was not significant (β = -.12, p = .12), and 
the indirect effects of fear on aggression through realistic and symbolic threat were not 
significant. The experience of fear associated with a social group increased perceptions of 
realistic and symbolic threat posed by that group, but fear was not related to anticipated 
aggressive behaviors. 
